

**COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD
AND RESERVES**

**HEARING ON RESERVE COMPONENT
POLICY REFORM**

**8:30 AM SESSION:
IMPLEMENTING RC REFORM IN THE SERVICES**

WELCOME:

**ARNOLD L. PUNARO, CHAIRMAN,
COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE**

WITNESSES:

**LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES V. LOVELACE,
USA, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3**

**MAJOR GENERAL RICHARD A. HUCK,
USMC, ASSISTANT DEPUTY COMMANDANT
FOR PLANS, POLICIES, AND OPERATIONS**

TUESDAY, APRIL 12, 2007

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ARNOLD L. PUNARO: Okay, the commission will come to order. Welcome to the ninth set of public hearings of the independent commission on the National Guard and Reserves. The commission is chartered by Congress to identify and recommend changes in law and policy to ensure that the National Guard and Reserves are tasked, organized, trained, equipped, compensated and supported to best to meet the national security requirements of our nation now and in the future.

Congress further expanded the commission's charter in last year's defense bill and directed us to report on the advisability and feasibility of implementing the provisions of the proposed National Defense Enhancement and National Guard Empowerment Act of 2006, which was reintroduced in this Congress. As directed, that report was submitted on March 1, 2007.

Of our 23 recommendations, only eight require changes to law, and of those eight, key portions could be advanced without legislative action. In the department, Assistant Secretary Hall has led a high-level working group examining these recommendations and working very closely with the chairman's key assistants, who will be testifying on the next panel. We look forward to hearing the department's official responses.

I think we've all on the commission been very encouraged by Secretary Gates' openness and receptivity to recommendations, as well as General Pace, as well as the folks we work with in Congress. So we've sort of gotten our recommendations to the powers that be and that action has moved from our in-box to their in-box, so we're now re-focused back on our original charter, addressing the multitude of issues that must be included in our final report, due no later than next January 31st, but we hope to get that done earlier than that, if possible.

In our March 1 report the commission provided an initial assessment of the current state of the National Guard and Reserves, based on an extensive series of hearings, meetings, field visits, focus groups, data analysis, and other research. One theme has emerged repeatedly: DOD has declared the reserve components to be an operational force and is using them accordingly.

This of course, as our witnesses well know, and the commissioners know, it's a profound shift from their historic role as a strategic force geared primarily for large-scale mobilizations. Unfortunately, the commission concluded, and some of our witnesses here today also were on the record on this same subject, that the statutes, policy, regulations, directives, practices, and budgets that govern and support the reserve components have not been changed to reflect that shift. We stated in our conclusion, simply declaring the reserve component to now be operational does not make it so.

Based on our analysis, the commission concluded in our March 1 report that, quote, "the current posture in utilization of the National Guard and Reserve as an

operational reserve is not sustainable over time, and if not corrected with significant changes to law and policy, the reserve component's ability to serve our nation will diminish," end quote. In the weeks and months ahead, we will focus in greater detail on what those needed changes are and how best to effect them.

There are a great number of initiatives underway in the Department of Defense, the Joint Staff, the military departments and the services. They recognize this and are working very diligently to make the changes. The initiatives address a broad spectrum of critical issues, including rebalancing the force, reserve component transformation, force generation, and mobilization policy.

So during this hearing we want to establish a baseline of where the department is today in its efforts to implement change in the reserve components, what it is doing now, how it plans to proceed in the future, and the likely impact of its efforts on the sustainability of the reserve component in the total force, both for the current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, but as our two witnesses know only too well here this morning, we've always got to keep our eye on the long term; we've always got to be making sure that we're focused on what our military needs to be able to do down the road as well.

The first panel is composed of the operation deputies for the Army and the Marine Corps, to provide an overview of reserve component reforms underway within the two services that have experienced the greatest stress on the force from Afghanistan and Iraq. They'll be followed by a joint panel. This afternoon we will conclude with testimony from senior civilian leadership in both DOD and the military departments.

At the end of today's hearings we hope to have a clearer picture of how current and future plan changes address the sustainability and utilization of the reserve components, whether they will create a sustainable operational reserve as envisioned in concepts like the Army's force generation model, and what problems are not adequately addressed by these changes and will require further analysis by the commission for possible inclusion in its final report due next January.

For our first panel this morning we welcome Lieutenant General James Lovelace, the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, 5 and 7, and Major General Rick Huck, the Marine Corps' Assistant Deputy Commandant for plans, policies, and operations. General Lepansky, the Deputy Commandant, had a long-standing conflict and was unable to be here this morning, but he's quite ably represented by General Huck.

The ops deputies incorporate their service's reserve components into both current and future total force plans and can offer a valuable perspective on what will be required to generate, utilize and sustain an operational Reserve over the long term. They can both provide a perspective from the trenches on Secretary Gates' January revisions to mobilization policy, and Secretary Chu's subsequent implementation guidance, including any anticipated impact on current or future force generation models.

And I would say for people that may not be as familiar with these jobs, these are probably two of the most difficult jobs in the Pentagon. These are the two individuals that on a day-to-day basis, they aren't the ones that are dreaming up the requirements. The requirements come in from the combatant commanders. They're not just fielding requirements from the Central Command combatant commanders dealing with Iraq and Afghanistan. They're dealing with requirements from the European Commander, from the NORTHCOM commander. All the requirements come in to them. They have no control over those and they are the ones that have to basically decide how they're going to source them in the near term, as well as making sure that they have the capacity for additional unforeseen requirements. So when people out in the field struggle from time to time, as many of us that have had some experience with, the word keeps changing, it's not because of – it doesn't originate in these two gentlemen's offices, and they probably have a better understanding and a better feel for the stress on the force than just about anybody because they're the ones that have to ensure that the combatant commanders are getting the force that they need.

In his December 2006 testimony, General Schumaker highlighted the serious and ever-increasing unit readiness impact of cross-leveling from departmental mobilization policies, and as we've said before, Secretary Gates took this head-on in his first weeks as secretary. Now that the implementing guidance has been issued, we will be very interested to hear about the Army and Marine Corps' plans for how these changes will have on the total force.

So General Lovelace, General Huck, we welcome you this morning and thank you for your long and distinguished service to the nation. Without objection, your written statements will be included in the record and we look forward to any comments you have here this morning. General Lovelace.

GENERAL JAMES LOVELACE: Thanks. It's a privilege to be here. I appreciate the endorsement about how difficult my job is. Maybe my high school teachers would not believe anything you say.

I don't envy – while you all don't envy what I do, I don't envy the challenge that you all have either. You all have probably – the significance of what y'all is going to recommend is huge. I've been back in the Pentagon five years, and in the G-3 for over 2.5, and there's a lot of issues that walk through my door. Some are small, some are large. But probably right now in my hand or – there just is a handful of things that are going to be generational in their impact and this issue about how we characterize it, the operationalizing of the Reserve, or probably what is the reserve component's characterization for the future, what part it plays in the strategy, that is probably primarily one of the top five things that we have to get right. We. We all have to get right. So that we have, whether it's in the States with the governors, with the AG's, with the Congress, administration inside of DOD, inside the Joint Staff, inside the Department of the Army. I mean, it's where we all have to understand and have a common operating picture of how we're going to use this very valued partner called the reserve component.

1970 was when I came in the United States Army, and the Army, active component was about 1.3 million duty active component. A lot in Europe, a lot in Vietnam. We had a more sizeable force in Korea. And at that time the reserve component was just over 600,000. And so over time what's happened is that, to fast forward, I won't walk you through each period of time, but now we said, and the reserve component makes up the majority of the million-man force that we have inside what's called the total army.

So just the sheer percentages gives you an idea about the magnitude and the value of what they do. Whether it's in the strategy for homeland defense, homeland security, whether it's in this issue about sustaining what is the global war on terror, which is the requirements of undetermined duration, or its ability to do major combat operations. So 3.5 years ago I had an opportunity, then as the director of the Army staff, to have a discussion with General Schumaker. He had been in the job only about four months and I went in with General John Lemoyne, who was the G-1 of the Army, and we talked about the concern because we were at points in time when we had a great acting secretary at that time also, Mr. Brownlee, of course. But we were at a point in time where we were concerned about the fracturing of the all-volunteer force. At least John Lemoyne and I was.

So we thoughtfully walked in, we think we're going to present something here just to the chief. And General Schumaker looks down and he says, you know, this is not about this all-volunteer force. He said, it's about the next right all-volunteer force. And so that's what we are about, is getting this next right all-volunteer force, whether it's the reserve component or the AC, because they are – it's a marriage. It's a very important marriage. And what this nation is and will be in the future, the ability to win this nation's wars is going to depend whether we get this right. So I look forward to your questions.

If I could, this point about the operational force being part of the operational Reserve, being part of the operational force, for the first time I think we can probably say, well, it's still two in the bush here. We're at least working towards in the program for the first time – I was in the directory of training in 1998 to 2000 – we have money behind what we're saying, which is different than where we have been in the past. That's a big deal. And so we're trying to get this right. We're on a journey. We're not there yet. So you're asking the right questions about what it is because we've started this. We've crossed the line of departure. We're not yet to the objective.

The end state is going to change because when we envisioned the all-volunteer force and the Reserves, it has always been an all-volunteer force. Now the whole force is all volunteer. Nobody probably thought in the 1970's, when we encapsulated that concept, would we have now in the turn of this century be engaged in a war that has lasted now longer than World War II. So I look forward to your questions. They're going to be thoughtful, and I think in this discussion that we'll have, we'll try to go ahead together.

MR. PUNARO: Thank you. General Huck.

GENERAL RICHARD HUCK: If you'll suffer with me for just a few minutes, I'd like to read a statement to you, and it will just be a few minutes. First of all, General Punaro and distinguished members of the commission, I'm happy to be here representing both Lieutenant General Lutansky (ph) and the United States Marine Corps.

I'd like to just point out to you, here's Captain Randy Boleves (ph) here. This guy has been on active duty. He's been in the selected Marine Corps Reserve. He's been an IRR, Individual Ready Reserve. He's been an IMA, and now he's an active reservist. To me, I didn't know that until last night. And to me that's the beauty of our association with our Reserve forces, that there's no R on him, on his uniform that says, I'm a reservist, from the reserve component.

I come to you today to kind of give you a thumbnail sketch of where we are right now. We're comprised – our Reserve is comprised of 34,900 and selected Marine Corps reserve. We've got drilling Reserve units. In our drilling Reserve units we've got 2,400 that are individual mobilization augmentees. We have 2,261 who are active Reserves, and nearly 60,000 who are in the Individual Ready Reserve. For your information, since 1 March of 2007 – as of 1 March 2007, 41,000 Reserve Marines have been mobilized since 9/11.

The capacity of our Reserves to augment and reinforce, and I'll keep with that theme of augment and reinforce the active component, reinforces the utility, flexibility and strength of the total force Marine Corps. To provide predictability, we have developed an integrated force generation model that lays out US MCR unit activation. This model will ultimately allow us to achieve the defense secretary's dwelve (ph) goal of 1 to 5.

The recent policy changes that the secretary has put forth allows us to do that augment and reinforce with individual Marines to battalion and squadron level units. This policy allows us to source units without negatively impacting the units on dwelve (ph) status. The utilization policy in conjunction with our force generation model further supports the long-term vision of the Marine Corps Reserves operational employment and it facilitates a sustainment of the reserve component.

The proposed increases to our active component end strength to 202,000 Marines will reduce the strain on the individual Marine and the institution. We believe our current authorized reserve component end strength of 39,600 selected Reserve Marines is adequate, but we are looking into it to see if adjustments have to be made. As our active force increases in size, our reliance on our reserve component should decrease, by helping us to achieve the desired deployment to dwelve ratio of 1 to 5. It's presently at 1 to 4 for the reserve component.

The funding increases and the flexibility inherent in the Reserve incentives provided in fiscal year 2007 NDAA are invaluable tools to assist in our continued recruitment and retention mission. The health care remains an essential part of

mobilization readiness for our reserve component. New streamlined health care benefits that Congress authorized this fiscal year will help ensure that our selected Marine Corps Reserve Marines and their families have access to affordable health care as they do their part to prosecute the global war on terror.

We believe the current OSD level oversight and funding of counseling and family support programs such as managed health care network and military one-source – my wife works as a contractor for military one-source – also significantly contributes to the long-term success and sustainability of our Reserve forces. The Marine Corps has no concerns with DOD Reserve activation policy as written, and it in fact very nicely supports our force generation model. It allows our commandant to support the combatant commanders throughout the world.

The bravery, sacrifice and commitment to war fighting excellence of our Reserve Marines have added new chapters to our history. These Marines recognize that they have an essential operational mission and that they have the solid backing of the American people. The Marine Corps fully understands that our greatest contribution to the nation is our high level readiness and our war fighting excellence across the spectrum of conflict. That readiness is predicated upon the sustained support of Congress, with which Marines will continue to be well equipped, well led and well trained total force of professionals and warriors.

Thank you for allowing me that opening statement.

MR. PUNARO: Thank you. We appreciate that. Let me start with both of you to try to see if I can get a better understanding of how you would describe the operational reserve. The working definition we've been using, and we put in our March 1 report, is one that Lieutenant General Odierno provided when he was the director of the Joint Staff in some very early testimony. This is definitely a paraphrase, and I've got the chairman's two special assistants sitting in the audience, so if I get it wrong, they're going to give me the evil eye. But here's kind of my characterization.

General Odierno told us that operational reserve, at least to him, meant that you're talking about a part-time force, some of which is fully employed full time at all times, and the part that is not fully employed at all times is waiting to get ready to be fully employed. So in other words, part-time force, some of which is on active duty at all times. The part that is not on active duty is getting ready to be on active duty.

Is that a good description in your mind? I mean, you're wrestling with this every day and you're trying to say, how do I implement this concept of operational reserve? How would y'all describe the operational reserve?

GEN. LOVELACE: Sir, I'll walk into this first. I'm sure in Ray's mind he absolutely understood everything that he said that he thought he said, all right. Basically I guess the way I would, if I could, again, walk back into, in the 70's and the 80's the reserve component was part of the strategic reserve. In other words, it would be some of

the last to walk into the fight, although when we looked at the early 70's, when we understand what was the Abrams doctrine, that basically when we went to war, we all went to war together. We put huge amounts of our CS, CSS in the force so that when we went, only naturally would we then walk and bring large portions of certain capabilities with us.

We did in Desert Shield, very evident. Huge amounts of reservists were brought on active duty, mobilized forward. Then again during the Balkans, when we had to sustain the Balkans, we brought huge numbers of the RC in. But what I would say is that when you look at the capacities inside the active component – and I'll use just brigade – if I could just use that as a denomination because it really represents the entirety of the force, both CS and CSS. Basically what we had looked at in the past is that when we went forward and we would react to any kind of incident, you would basically be an all AC force. And then at some points you would see, in the time phase deployment you would have your RC show up on the battlefield.

Now what happens is, is that in the capacities that the strategies that this nation is asking, from national security down to the national military, and most recently what has come out of the QDR, they're asking for a capacity. And I'm talking about numbers. And so – and the numbers within which they are asking for, you know, these numbers – you've all heard them. It's a supply-based strategy. It's about 14 active, and then four to five Reserve, all right? That's what the strategy says that we're supposed to do in a steady state, or in a surge operation.

Now I think that what Ray was referring to, so as I use that 14 and 4/5, in the 4/5, if when you then rotate through the Army force generation you get to that point where you're in the available pool which is those that can be deployed, you know, if there's a mission then you get deployed. If you don't have a mission that the nation's asking then you don't get deployed. That's why they're called an operational reserve because it's not that they're in the Reserve but that operationally you have them in an operational reserve, and so if the nation's asking, then they're available. Hopefully that makes –

MR. PUNARO: Yes, and I mean – I really – that's extremely helpful, and I'll get to General Huck in a second. Let me – but the key is, you don't necessarily know for any given situation or any given date which 4 or 5 reserve component BCP's are going to be the ones that actually get activated. Because it may be one for a certain scenario, but if you have another one come up, it's going to be a different one.

GEN. LOVELACE: Well, sir, the way I would phrase this is, there's a confluence of several things here. One, the Army's been on a force generation model. We were supposed to get to IOC this year. I mean, the initial operating capability this year, and then with the final operating capability next year. And basically the Army is running on a force generation. So when you ask, do you know which ones those are, it's as they matriculate through the force then essentially we rely on the Army National Guard to start queuing them up. We rely on the Reserves, on General Stultz to line up and his forces also, so they matriculate through on what is one year deployed, potentially

deployed if required, and then it would be five years back at home station. That's why they get to the – some people say 1 in 5, some people say 1 in 6. But it's one year deployed for every five years back. But they line up the queue, and so we kind of know.

But you're right. Then you know, for example, if it's a combat formation then you send combat capabilities. But like for example, when we went into Pakistan after the earthquake, we sent humanitarian. So it can be combat support, medical hospitals. Those kinds of things. So yes.

MR. PUNARO: So the challenge for the reserve component leaders is, they've got to look at the cascading readiness required to basically be in a position to provide for the Army those capabilities, or capacities as you said, that they're going to need when they need them. So I mean, the huge difference here is, in the strategic reserve, when we had a commitment to have in NATO against the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, 10 division in 10 days, the RC was way down the line as you identified them. They had a long-term mobilization plan and they had certain days to get ready, and they weren't in the fight in the early periods.

Now you've embedded into your capacity plans at any one time 4 to 5 RC. But that means that then they've got to figure out how much of the additional reserve component do they need to be getting spun up to get ready. Let's say those forces go forward. So that's why I think General Odierno, what was significant to me about what he said is, he didn't make any distinction between – he said the people that are not on active duty need to be ready to go on active duty. So that basically says, and I know this isn't what he meant – you keep everybody at C-1 status at all times. Well, I don't think that's kind of affordable.

GEN. LOVELACE: And really across the Army we don't keep everybody at C-1 status. And basically as you go from your deployed to your next to deployed, to those that are reset and trained for the active component it's a year long. For the reserve component it is four years long. But as you go from your first year back and you matriculate your way through years 2, 3 and 4, you are building readiness in that force.

And so the other thing that is – and I think important here is that we use this Army prioritization. I mean, it's called – we prioritize requirements. Basically in the past reserve component would be at the very bottom of this. Now what you see is that you see this integrated deployment of forces matriculate up from the reset trained, to the ready, and that's by AC and RC. So everybody gets appropriately their equipment. And units back here do not have everything, both AC and RC. But what we do give them is their equipment in theater, theater provided equipment.

Again, it's a confluence of generated and the force. The sort of catalyst for this is the prioritization list, so it's helped change things. Then we're resourcing the RC in ways that we have not in the past. This next supplemental we've asked for in the main about \$5 billion, and most of it – not most of it, almost half of it is to repay the – especially the National Guard, equipment that both the USAR and the National Guard left behind.

MR. PUNARO: General Huck, same general question about how would you describe in the Marine Corps the operational reserve.

GEN. HUCK: The strategic and operational missions for the reserve component I never heard of until last week, all right, and quite frankly, as I read some of the things the smart guys gave me, I said, what's the big deal? To me, the strategic would sit on the shelf and wait for the big one, the big mission, and then you came on after active component units had been committed.

Right now what we're dealing with, if you want to call it operational, fine. But what we have is man trained and equipped and integrated reserve component units that have a force generation model that gives them predictability, and allows them to look at the plan. In the Marine Corps we call a TEDP (ph), a training exercise and deployment plan that tells you when you're on the dot for your next mission. And that allows you to do the man trained and equipped to get yourself ready for that particular mission when you know it's going to appear.

So to me it's the integration of our reserve component into the total force Marine Corps, where before when we talked at the strategic level, and it's been dated back to the Vietnam days, there was less integration. Like I said in my example with Capt. Randy Beleves here, I had no idea that he was in the reserve component. And that's the way it should be.

GEN. LOVELACE: Sir, one other quick comment here to tag on with Rick. I think that's why right now importantly what all of our forces say is that when you cross the berm heading north, whether it's Afghanistan or into Iraq, we're putting y'all, we all are, this nation is putting the best trained, best equipped, best led force. The energies of our institution go behind to make sure that everybody meets that standard and they have the equipment that they need, that they've been trained on the missions that they're about to take on, and that the leaders have had an opportunity to prepare themselves for this point in time.

MR. PUNARO: The second question is, as you sit at your desk each and every day and you're meeting the requirements of the combatant commanders – and again, you're getting them from more than CENTCOM, and of course particularly in the Army you could have a domestic requirement laid on your desk pretty quickly from JDAMS, particularly for the Guard. So it's not just the overseas mission.

As you are sitting there saying, okay, how are we going to get the brigades or the capabilities they need? Are there laws, rules or regulations that you say, holy smokes, if only we didn't have to deal with that, we could be a lot more predictable or a lot more efficient or do this a lot better than we're doing? Is there any one or two or three things that jump out in your mind that you've had to kind of work around and if you could kind of plow those down with a bulldozer you would?

GEN. LOVELACE: Sir, I guess the way I would walk into the question is, right now I don't see anything that is necessarily inhibiting. It's really gets into – I tell you what, it's been interesting to watch the formation of NORTHCOM. It's been interesting to watch the after-action reviews of Katrina. We stood up Army North at San Antonio to be the Army service component command, and that was pretty much a pretty big deal for us because we made a commitment then to not only NORTHCOM, making a commitment to NORTHCOM we made a commitment to the nation as far as the primary task was just the homeland defense, homeland security. So we're beginning to get ourselves in a formation so that you have now a need to get clarity on the unity of command and unity of effort.

So those are the things that I think we're beginning to work our way through here. I think that's probably the most important thing that has to be done, is understanding what is the chain of command. It's interesting. I mean, I'm not trying to give a civics lesson, but I'm learning a heck of a lot from Claude Vaughn and a lot of his people here that helped me understand and have a shared appreciation. And I've been fortunate. I'm not like every officer. I've had an opportunity serve in 1st Army. I served there for about almost two years. So I've had an opportunity to see the RC and appreciate what they are and what they can do. But we need to get after the unity of command.

That to me is, is that understanding then – because people don't – not don't understand, but people don't appreciate fully the authorities of the government and the state. And the understand then where do you federally help in direct support. Because everybody wants to help. That's the goodness of our country is everybody rushed to that point in time, rushed to the sound of the gun. But then we need to understand who's in charge, with what resources, and what we're capable of doing.

MR. PUNARO: Do you have key members of your staff that are from the Guard and Reserve that are serving on full-time active duty on your staff?

GEN. LOVELACE: Sir, I do.

MR. PUNARO: Any idea of what percentage of your staff is reserve component?

GEN. LOVELACE: Sir, I tell you what. I have no idea. All I know is, some of the best people who walk in my door are RC.

Let me do this. I'll embarrass him here a little bit here. Mike Semansky, who's been with me for about two years, and he is a USAR officer. You'd never know. I mean, he is a wonderfully talented leader who had an opportunity to come work and be a part of the G-3, and he helps me daily, not only in just Reserve matters but he helps me daily in issues of where we're trying to take the Army, and I have here Randy Manor (ph) is a one-star in the National Guard. Two both very talented leaders. Randy's a young officer charging ahead here with just a great future that lies ahead of him. So I'm very blessed.

I do have – and I'll see if we can't pull it up to you, but it's integrated because we deal in – matter of fact, what happens is if you don't have RC officers deal with just RC issues. You have RC officers deal with Army issues, and so it's – the integration is not by component in a specific lane.

MR. PUNARO: General Huck, are there any big roadblocks or impediments to y'all providing the force that you need that you can think of?

GEN. HUCK: Well, you said at the beginning the co-COM's and others produce what we consider an endless list of requirements, important requirements. You have to rack and stack those things and look at your inventory of what you can apply to a problem. It's the stand-up of afri-com (ph), it's the c-smurf (ph) of the homeland security side. It's the Afghanistan conflict, it's Iraq, it's the transition training teams. And they're all valid requirements. You just have to rack and stack them, and our job is to make sure that there's a baseline that we kind of call redline of how many battalions, infantry battalions out of the 24 that we have can we commit without putting ourselves in jeopardy of a show-stopper.

So I mean, right now, you know, we look at the two surge battalions that we provide. We look at the six that are already over in Iraq. We look at two security force battalions that work in Iraq, and then we have three battalions that are out with the Marine Expeditionary units at one time, and we try to make sure that we service the requirements that come in from wherever they come in, without breaking our backs.

MR. PUNARO: Great. Thank you. Commissioner –

GEN. LOVELACE: If I could. Do you mind?

MR. PUNARO: Yes, go ahead, sir.

GEN. LOVELACE: First off, our G-2 job – I mean, I read all the questions that y'all have been asking in the past here a little bit. But you know, this question about what the requirements are. I think there has to be an understanding of what are going to be the limits of the dance, or what you want DOD to do and the capabilities that you want to provide. That needs to be understood because otherwise what you do is you get into the building and you get into the tension of programmatic. That's a nasty world to necessarily deal with. It really is because the limits of the dance then are capped by how much money.

So I think that, to piggyback what Rick is saying here is, you get into the issue here. We now have another combatant commander, you have NORTHCOM, but you also have the governors who are asking. And so it's been interesting because also what we're trying to do is understand that. I think we reacted in a, I feel, somewhat a positive way here reference last spring, and we're doing it again this spring when we're getting ready to go through hurricane season. We're really trying to address the needs and capabilities to raise in this prioritization list those states that need to get assets to be

prepared for what is a mission, no different than it's a mission, whether it's in Iraq, Afghanistan, EUCOM, PACOM. And so – but again, the defining of that requirement specifically for what kind of capabilities you want to build.

Otherwise what we build is we build capabilities based upon the em-toe (ph), the war-fighting mission. And then how do you then represent what are you going to do specifically, uniquely perhaps, that still has translatability into the part of the war-fighting force. And so I think that was one of the questions that you all have asked in the past, and I think trying to help shed a little bit of light on it.

MR. PUNARO: That's very helpful. Commissioner Lewis?

MS. LEWIS: Mr. Brownlee, did you want to make a comment before I start with my questions?

MR. BROWNLEE: Trying to get your attention.

MR. PUNARO: Oh, I'm sorry, Les.

MR. BROWNLEE: I just didn't want to miss the opportunity because what we've got here is two senior general officers who represent the ground combat forces of all our military, and I think it's pretty widely acknowledged that that's who's carrying the load right now in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. I just want to take a brief moment, if I could, to just pay to tribute and express gratitude to all these wonderful young men and courageous young men and women who have volunteered to serve their country in uniform during a time of war. I think they truly represent America's best.

To paraphrase Winston Churchill after the Battle of Britain, never have so many owed so much to so few. So I just wanted to get that on the record and be sure that you can carry that message back to these great soldiers and Marines who have, many of them, just been informed their tours have been extended. National Guard brigades alerted to possible deployment early next year. And they're the ones who continue to shoulder the load day after day, repeated combat tours, providing protection for all of us. I just didn't want to miss the opportunity to say that since we had the representative of great Marines and Army here in front of us.

MR. PUNARO: Thanks, Les, and I know all the members of the commission identify and share your sentiments.

Commissioner Lewis.

MS. LEWIS: We certainly do share those sentiments. And as we were discussing the force generation models a few moments ago in the conversation with the chairman, it is a tremendous pool of young men and women that are serving our country. Are you at all concerned about the pool of resources, and do you feel that the force generation models are feasible and can be resourced with our current pool of eligibles, as you see it?

GEN. HUCK: If you don't mind, I'll take that up first. As long as you can maintain the pool, and that's an unknown in the future. I mean, the Marine Corps has been authorized to grow to 200 and 2 K. We're going to have the active component and the reserve component going after the same pool of people. And the question really becomes, is the pool of available people that you want to pursue out there? I mean, as you ramp up your end-strength, you have to increase the number of recruiters you have, have to have facilities, on down the line. But as of right now, the policy guidance that came out from the secretary of defense happens to very nicely dovetail into our force generation model, and it's been a godsend to us because it gives the reserve component the predictability that they seek.

But as Mr. Brownlee said, they're great Americans out there. I told Chairman Punaro that I just – it's amazing to me. I've been around for 36 years now on active duty, to see men and women that are re-enlisting. We don't have problems re-enlisting anybody. Now a lot of that is because of incentives that have been offered, and the same for the people being recruited. But there are just great men and women out there that want to do this. I mean, if you're a Marine, as our commandant says, you want to go to the sound of the guns.

But to dovetail on what Mr. Brownlee said, there's a cost, and we need to keep continuing talking about that cost. I commanded the 2nd Marine division in Iraq and 318 men and women didn't come home with me.

MS. LEWIS: General Lovelace?

GEN. LOVELACE: Well, ma'am, our enlistment statistics for the active component of the National Guard, we've seen 100 percent USAR's falling behind a little bit. Excuse me, the enlistment percentages are better than 100 percent. And our re-enlistment percentages are above 100 percent. I think that's what Rick's talking about here a little bit.

We do. I guess the way that the chief and the secretary have phrased it, if I could just plagiarize on what they've said is, is that, you know, we get people in, and I think a tribute to our wonderful institutions is that people stay with us, so that's important.

On the USAR, I'll let Mr. James talk more about the recruiting aspects of it, but I know that the Guard has had a very successful recruiting because they recruit and they use a hometown approach. That's the strength. This is a neighborhood kind of quality and dynamic. That's why also with that we want to make sure that when we mobilize the force, we mobilize them as units, not as individuals, so that it's spread across.

And then y'all know the statistics. I mean, y'all have heard the chief give this. The number of eligible between 18 and 24, what the size is, how many can't come in because they're not physically eligible, how many that can't come in because they morally can't or intellectually can't. And so you find – you whittle that population down

from, what's it, about 2.4 million down to about, you know, one-third, of which now you competed against those that want to go to college, but we're still able to. And we think that as we grow the force here by 7,000 in the AC, we're going to grow the National Guard to 358, and what we're going to do is grow the whole in the USAR and build them by an additional 1,000 in the next five years. We're confident that we can do it, and not only confident we can do it, we need to do it, and that's what we intend to do. And I'll let Mr. James talk more about specifically the recruiting aspects of this.

MS. LEWIS: Okay, thank you. The secretary recently issued a memo on utilization of the total force addressing the unit-based mobilization that you mentioned, and involuntary mobilization of a year and minimizing stop-loss. I was wondering if each of you could just share your experience with the mobilization and de-mobilization process and explain a little bit more specifically how the secretary's new policy is going to improve that process.

GEN. LOVELACE: I'll let him jump on this one.

GEN. HUCK: Always push the junior guy to the grenade.

GEN. LOVELACE: We've done this before together.

GEN. HUCK: As I said, this policy memorandum that came out really dovetails nicely with what we're trying to do. Especially the fact that now, instead of having that one year cutoff on involuntary mobilization, now being able to use the full two years is a real godsend to us and removes a big obstacle to what we were doing. That also exempts the training time and the demobilization time, exempted from the one-year consecutive.

So also the fact that we are being told to mobilize by units. What was happening was that, both on the active component and the reserve component, was that the first unit out the door you have to get ready. So what you end up doing is if the first battalion is going of a regiment, you end up going to the second and third battalion, and you move those guys forward. That fixes your immediate problem, but it kills you later down the road because you're robbing Peter to pay Paul. So this gives us some stability, and now those personnel gains that have gone on in the past won't happen. That's going to give the predictability to the guy who is in the second battalion and the third battalion, to know that he's not going to be slammed into the first battalion. And then when the second battalion has to go then he's going to get double jeopardy there.

So also the stop-loss that hasn't affected the Marine Corps very much, and I know that the commandant really considers that a red line. I mean, he'll cut off his right arm before he wants to go to stop-loss. And also the direction in the policy memo that we review our hardship waiver policy. I have no concern about that whatsoever because the commanders in our reserve component do that on a daily basis. Does that answer your question?

MS. LEWIS: Just one more question. Do you have the resources for the increased pre-mobilization training, or is there anything that we can do as we look at this issue to help you be where you need to be?

GEN. HUCK: Our training allowance, the equipment, we've asked in the upcoming supplemental for \$252 million to increase the training allowance pool for our reserve component. If that is approved, that's going to help out immensely. But I want you to understand that an active component, a reserve component unit, the ones next in the chute are not wanting for equipment, all right. And they fall in on the same equipment when they get to their destination as an AC unit. There's no difference.

MS. LEWIS: General Lovelace?

GEN. LOVELACE: The essence of the one year mobilization is one of the most powerful enabling aspects of being able to generate the force from the Army's perspective. We're a little bit different than the Marines. I mean, we have 55 percent of the United States Army is in the RC. A little bit different situation, smaller reserve component. And so we rely in greater percentages on what the reserve component can do.

Early on in the conflict what we did is we were able to essentially have cohesive units. We still had volunteers because you still had duty MOSQ, you had over-structure in the force, so we still had to rely on volunteers. But you basically had the integrity of a unit for the very early stages of the 10L3 (ph), the movement to contact of Baghdad, and then the first rotations or so. What we're finding now is, as we've gotten into the subsequent rotations, that more and more of the force as we mobilize the reserve component flag, especially as we would mobilize some flags for a second time and we rely on what was the distinction between what's in law, which is consecutive versus the policy, DOD policy, which was cumulative, what you basically had was that we relied on volunteers.

So you take, for example, when we mobilized the 30th, the 39th or the 81st, some of the very first BCT's that we put into the conflict, versus the 1st and 34th of the Minnesota, who is doing a great job right now on an extension of 124 days themselves, announced back in January – the first group came from much fewer states. Last unit still doing great, came from in excess of about 34 states. And so what you see is that that's why then when you get into the unreadiness of the Reserve component, you have – the biggest issue is about personnel, although equipping is not far behind.

Therefore, when you come to what was the secretary of defense's mobilization policy, it really was a re-mob policy, which we did not have. We did not have a re-mob policy at that time. So what that did was, it gave us a vehicle now so that we could go out, and you then join that with such things as Army force generation, the prioritization list that we talked about, the Army prioritization requirements list. And what you see now is when you mobilize a unit, on this case we're trying to not only mobilize but a big piece of that was to now alert, as we've been talking about, gives predictability, which

you all think, I think, is of value. Then you have predictability. People know that they're going. They know in advance. They have an appreciable amount of time.

But then what this means is that you've got to move from the right side of mob to left side of mob training. And I know that y'all are looking at such things as medical. That's one of the big ones. That's a big deal because what you want to make sure is is that you've got to have – because basically you've got to have about 90 percent of your people there. You've got to have some equipment to train on and you've got to have 90 percent of your people there. So that's why then it allows the commander much more time, and the institution of the Guard and the Army to get behind to make sure that we have that amount of time to get that unit ready so that when it mobs it does its finishing touches, and then we get about nine months boots on the ground.

Hey, we're starting at this from a standing start, you know. And so it's a little bit, you know – there's some friction in the gears right now, but we're working through this. As far as the funding, you know, we need about \$285 million. This fiscal year. And we need more for the next fiscal year. But we're working those with the department and we'll get there.

MS. LEWIS: Thank you both very much. My time has expired.

MR. PUNARO: Thank you. Commissioner McKinnon.

MR. McKINNON: It's good to have some frank discussion here and we really appreciate it from both of you. Just go back in history a little bit. General, you've talked about the size of the Army back in 1970, and at that time it was roughly two-thirds – the active force was roughly double what the Reserve force was. Today the active is smaller than the Reserve force. Did the Army object much to the downsizing of the Army during this period of time, where we've – from 1970 to today?

GEN. LOVELACE: Captain Lovelace did. You know, I didn't really know what was going – (laughter). That's probably a legitimate question. I mean, but I'm trying to give a thoughtful answer here. I think the way I would answer this is, is that, you know, it's really very interesting. When I come on the Hill, not necessarily talk to you all, but when I come on the Hill and they ask me to discuss readiness, and so my question to them is, you know, are you ready – are you large enough, are you ready enough? And I said, okay, let's discuss strategy. So that has to be the starting point.

So what you see is, is that as we went from the 70's, which was one of containment. We went to a strategy of basically being able to fight either in Korea in the early 80's, to Korea or the Soviet Union. And so we got away from a containment strategy. So you know, I don't know if the Army objected, but what you saw was is a shaping of the force reflective of the strategy, all right? And so that's why now – I guess I'm not sure if that's helpful, but that's why now the questions that people ask me, is the army large enough, and my point is that is what do you want the strategy to be? The

discussion needs to start at the point of strategy. So I don't know, but I would think that the strategy helped shape the force, and so on.

MR. McKINNON: Well, of course strategy is based on threat, I assume.

GEN. LOVELACE: And sir, you know, it was during that time. And now it's based on who is the threat. This is a very uncertain time. What are we going to ask the nation to do? I'm sure that people would never have envisioned years ago that, you know, we were even going to be in Georgia. I mean, Georgia is a country, although it's a state also. I mean, we're in Georgia.

MR. McKINNON: Well, bringing it forward, you talked about the next right volunteer force, and then the question today, is the Army sized properly as the next right sized force today.

GEN. LOVELACE: Is that a question or a statement?

MR. McKINNON: It's a question.

GEN. LOVELACE: I was hoping it was going to be a statement. (Laughter.)

Sir, I think that is the Army sized right, and I'll give you this in gross terms. If we went in accordance with the Army operational avail – not the Army. It's the operational availability phase. The Army would have to be huge, the Air Force would have to be huge, the Navy would have to be huge, so would the Marine Corps. So you have to find somewhere is a sweet spot between what is the strategy and the programatics of what you can. So I think that what you see is that we're moving in the right direction as far as the size. I think that's why we welcome this growth to 74,000. We think that it's moving us in the right direction. We think we can grow, and then provide ready units, both in the AC and RC importantly. So we're moving in the right direction. But these are uncertain times.

That's why what you see is is that this recent announcement yesterday about the active component like Mr. Brownlee was talking about, being extended into CENTCOM AOR for 15 months is a big deal. Why we want to get predictability on the backside.

MR. McKINNON: General Huck, I don't know if you have any comments on that part of it, but I noticed on the Marines, that you're activating the IRR. I would assume as you tier things (that) you have the active forces, you have the Reserve, and as you go down the IRR is sort of at the bottom of the manpower pool. Why are they activating that? What kind of people are coming up in the IRR? Manpower. I mean, what ranks.

GEN. HUCK: The coin of the realm in the global war on terror is the field grade officer in many cases, to fill out different staff assignments. We have recalled – an authorized recall, 2,500 of the IRR. We sent out letters to 1,800 of them, with a goal of

getting 1,200. We said, well, wait a minute. If you order someone to active duty, why do you have 18 to 12? Well, the problem is on the Reserve side of the house that as a member separates from organizational oversight, things change. I mean, women become pregnant, people's medical conditions deteriorate, you lose track of them through the mobilization command. But we had filled 731 of those 1,200 goal that we have right now.

The end strength plus-up that we're seeking does three things for us. It's going to balance our MAGTF, Marine air ground task forces so that they're more equal. Right now there is an unbalance in the one that is over in Okinawa in the western Pacific is smaller than the ones on the east and west coast of the United States. And it's going to also allow us to apply units to other missions that we, quite frankly, have atrophied, all right. The jungle operations, mountain operations, amphibious operations have all been stressed because of OIF and OEF. Then by also growing the force we're going to be able to have a bigger pool of people to put toward these individual augment assignments that continually pop up in the transition teams we pick. The military police or the border, that are quite frankly – that stress us right now.

MR. MCKINNON: As we talk about manpower, manpower's only good if they have the equipment to do the job. In several areas we're concerned, of course, from the domestic side as well. It seems to me you have sort of three threats out there. You have the domestic threat, you have the terrorist threat. There's Islamic terrorism, and then you have the potentials of people like Iran or North Korea or Russia or some other countries, China, down the road.

As we look on the domestic side, the commission in their report on March 1 talked that they didn't feel it was adequately addressed what equipment we're having through the homeland security or homeland defense mission. From the Army's standpoint, have they specified any specific equipment from a budget standpoint? General Lovelace?

GEN. LOVELACE: Sir, I would lead in with several thoughts. One is that I think that's why, when – although it's not in writing, it is in verbal. I'm not seeing it in writing. It could be, and that's why when General Baum says the commitment to the governor is that you have 50 percent of your force back, all right. That's about manpower now.

I know that the Guard and the Reserves started out probably at about 65 to 70 percent of their equipment and that's where they were, and then they left portions of it. And I think that to keep this in perspective, not only did they leave while they left. I think it was about 4 to 2 percent, depending on which one of the Reserves you're talking about. It wasn't just that they left equipment. It's that they left their best stuff too. That's why, then, in the supplemental, and I would have to get back to you but I think it's important piece, is that I think that it's carried through into Congress was the desire to now find, to begin to fill that hole. But you don't do it overnight. It takes time. I mean,

once you put a payment down on a vehicle, it takes 18 to 24 months to get that piece of equipment restored. But there is a commitment to do that.

That's why we're trying – we tried to address last spring, and we're doing – matter of fact, tomorrow there's a drill at Belvoir to work through with the horizontal, as they call them, from Texas to Florida, and then the vertical from Florida to Maine, to include the island states – not the island states, but the islands and territories of both Puerto Rico and all. So we're trying to work to make sure that in the prioritization of equipment we can address those needs in what I call a tactical sense because they're staring me in the face right now.

The long-term commitment, I think, is one where, you know, from the 05 to 11, you know, when we heard the leadership talk, we talked about the 20-plus billion dollars that is in the palm. Now when you go from 05 to 13, the numbers start to approach like \$36 billion. Did I say million or billion? I meant billion. And then we throw on top of it additional one-plus billion for aviation. So the commitment's there.

But this is a little bit like the physiology of a muscle, you know. It atrophied over time. It's going to take us time to get there. But I share the anxiety as we're now trying to meet what are the requirements being generated by the first priority, which is homeland defense, homeland security, at the same time sustain the global war on terror, at the same time trying to meet the major combat operations. I think that's why you saw General Schumaker and I know that General Casey has assessed pretty much the same way. I'll let him speak for himself, but in a general sense, as well as what was Dr. Harvey and now Mr. Gehring (ph), the acting secretary, is a commitment to equip the force, but at the same time, when we talk about right now the operational demand – and operational demand is not just what is in Iraq and Afghanistan. The operational demand also includes a representation of, like what you're addressing, sir, is the homeland defense, homeland security. The operational demand exceeds the strategy, exceeds the resources. I know we talked about that before.

MR. McKINNON: Let me just ask one final question here. I've seen figures that show about \$52 billion has been requested and it's in the out-years of 13 to 15, to get us whole. It's about \$24 billion going to the Guard and \$10 billion to the Reserves and \$18 billion to the active forces. That's a long time away. And if we have the need, shouldn't that need to be fulfilled now without waiting that long?

GEN. LOVELACE: Sir, I appreciate fully what you're saying.

MR. McKINNON: Okay.

GEN. LOVELACE: Can that be a safe answer? I mean, it is. If you're talking to the operator that wants to make sure that when you cross the berm – now crossing the berm is in a literal sense also – or a figurative sense, rather. Crossing the berm can mean when you get ready to go do – let's show up at New Orleans, or let's show up wherever it is – it's being the best trained, the best equipped force. So I don't think the Army has

been bashful in talking about its holes. I don't think the Army has been bashful, and this is total Army, for all the requirements – all combatant commanders, to include those represented here in the homeland – have been bashful about saying what its needs are. And I think so often now, as you see the front page, but it is also making sure that what is in the home state – the home station for those that are required to guard the homeland are equally as trained and equipped.

I mean, one of the biggest things right now on my plate right now that I'm dealing with is the 10-meter target is to get to the duty MOSQ issue inside of the National Guard and the USAR. Now the National Guard has a little bit of a larger issue than does the USAR. But I mean, that is a big deal. So we're looking at – because all I was trying to do was complement what you were saying, sir. When you're talking about equipment, we want to get the kids trained also.

MR. MCKINNON: There are so many questions here. You bring up training. Is the time of training adequate for the Guard, 39 days a year, or should it be increased?

GEN. LOVELACE: Sir, you would have to help me understand the construct of what you're saying now. The way I would answer that is this, is that as I work my way back, what we want to do is we want to make sure that back from latest arrival date in theater, or you know, clearly we have in defining the requirements, all we now as a nation funding all those requirements, at the present time do we need to? Yes. But as far as giving them adequate training, not one person deploys, not one unit deploys that is not trained, equipped. Every unit. This is total force, AC and RC. They're the best trained, best equipped, best led force, or they don't go. They don't go.

I tell you what. He has his notoriety because of Katrina, but his team at 1st Army, Russ Honoray (ph), and it is not just a AC team. This is a complement between the Army active component and the RC. There's a huge job as they facilitate. They don't get them ready. It's the leadership of the Guard and Reserve that gets their units ready. They help facilitate that frame. And so it is a combined effect.

So, sir, when you say do they have enough time, I think that, you know, that's why clearly in the mobilization policy of the secretary of defense we want to alert as soon as we can one year out, and we support that. We think it's smart. That's where the Guard and the Reserve both would like the stop-loss to start, but stop-loss has an unfortunate connotation. So – but they don't go unless they're trained. They don't go unless they're equipped, and they don't go unless they're well led and we make sure they get that done before they get there.

Now if you're talking about do we need to build – I'm sorry, sir. I'm geared up today because this is just an important issue here. But if you're talking about building the readiness and the strategic depth, we're on record as saying we need to do that and build a readiness because we want the force to be ready not when you enter, not as you enter the ready pool. We want you to be ready as you enter – we don't want you to get ready

after you get into the ready pool. We want you to be ready when you come into the ready pool.

MR. McKINNON: The question was, do you think 39 days is enough? To do that.

GEN. LOVELACE: Sir, I wish you'd said that up front now. And the answer to that is, right now – and the model – and I'd be happy to get you what we're looking at. The requirement is more than that. Especially in the year, you know, between the alert. And I'll get you the exact number, because it differs by unit. If you're an empty unit, you have more days. If you're an aviation unit, you need more days. If you're transportation – not that those skills aren't as important, but you can sustain them much more easily in fewer days.

MR. McKINNON: We'd appreciate that for the record because this is a serious issue and we're looking at it.

GEN. LOVELACE: I'd be happy to provide it because we can also align what is counted the days also in 1, 2, and 3.

MR. PUNARO: Commissioner Stockton.

MR. STOCKTON: Thank you, gentlemen, for being here with us today. We appreciate your advice to us as we try to work through these difficult issues, as I know you're trying to work through these difficult issues as well. General Lovelace, I guess I'd like to ask you this question about equipment funding now. The Army has stated it plans to spend \$21 billion over the next five years to improve the Army National Guard's equipment status. However, the commission's review of the Army National Guard procurement count shows that actual funding in the year of execution has often fallen short of projected spending. This gap between programming and budget was especially large in the past, and in particular in 03 to 05.

I guess my question is this. Will the \$21 billion in projected funding for the next five years ensure that every National Guard unit is able to meet the readiness targets of the new force generation model? And then secondly, will the Army ensure that that money is made available and spent as projected?

GEN. LOVELACE: The answer to that I want to be is yes, but there are things that happen, so there – I think that for the first time there is larger amounts of money that are resident in the program to afford a building of the readiness of the Guard in ways it has not been in the past. And I'm not going to necessarily attest to the numbers. I'd prefer that because when you say for the next five years, I want to make sure that we're talking about the same numbers and all.

I tell you what, that is a commitment, and I'll just tell you how it manifests itself in the bowels of the Pentagon. I myself and Dave Melcher and Steve Speaks, three

individuals that head up the eight and the financial manager, the deputy – Dave is the financial manager to the comptroller now. We essentially are not allowed to steal that money away from reserve component. That is a promise. That is a covenant, and if something happens – that's why if I say something happens then we have to go back to the leadership so we can make sure we share what it is that is so premierly important that we now have to break a promise to the reserve component. That's the powerfulness of that commitment that I don't think that no one necessarily is not going to have in the past, but now what we have present in place. So that's how I see it.

So behaviorly, in the bowels of the Pentagon we have changed our behavior. We changed, you know, the importance. And that's why then the reflection of the priorities of the kinds of things that we're discussing this morning become so premierly important. They're on my scope. What I basically do for the United States Army – I've got a wonderful job. I've got gifted people that work for me, thank goodness, because they're not -- (inaudible) -- but they're just wonderful people. Is that what we basically do is we validate requirements and we prioritize for them. I do this on behalf of the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army. That's how we're operating right now.

Now whether that fills all the holes, I think it gets to Mr. McKinnon's point before because in the extended planning horizon beyond the palm there's still a huge amount of dollars, right? But, sir, things happen. Let me give you one example. Just as we walk into the Board of Security, all right, we had us on the supplemental as \$1.9 billion, right. \$1.2 (billion) of that was for the United States Army. At that point that money in the supplemental, although it's going to be repaid, right, it was taken out of the supplemental for the Army, used to now address a very critical issue that the administration wanted to address. But we lost then that \$1.2 – I said million – billion dollars, until we get it then restored in the next year's supplemental. And so we lost that period of buying power.

So under those kind of extremis conditions, then, you know, there's this commitment. And as long as our funding stream stays the same and we don't get cut – I mean, those are the kind of conditions that I think reasonable people can agree to. So there's not an absolute, but I tell you what, it's the closest daggone thing you can get to to an absolute. I'm not sure if that's helpful or not.

MR. STOCKTON: Thank you, sir. I guess I should have said before I asked the question, I'm from the Show Me state and I guess actions to me always speak louder than words.

GEN. LOVELACE: You're exactly right.

MR. STOCKTON: I'd like to refocus on rebalancing between the AC and the RC. I'll give you a little historical background here about my question. Going back to July of 2003, our former secretary of defense stated that the balance of capabilities in the active and reserve components today is not the best for the future. Of course his statement went on to say a lot of particular things which I'm not going to reiterate at this

point. But then subsequently the Department of Defense report in January of 2004, titled "Rebalancing Forces: Easing the stress on the Guard and the Reserves," stated that there is a need for rebalancing to improve the responsiveness of the force and to help ease the stress on units and individuals with skills in high demand.

The global war on terrorism has accelerated the challenge. The report provided the review of the service rebalancing initiatives planned for the fiscal year 2005 and beyond. So my question, what has your service done recently to continue to rebalance forces, and do you think your active and reserve components are properly balanced to carry out current missions?

GEN. LOVELACE: I was hoping Rick was going to jump onto this one real quick here but I can see he's not.

Sir, basically we went into – it was interesting as we did the run-up for 10L3 victor, and what we did was that we stopped – what we did is that were units whose capabilities were on the tip-vid (ph) that we now had to stop the inactivation of because we needed them, especially for the rotation pieces on the back side. You know, our rebalancing efforts will continue, but I could characterize them now as we look to the future a little bit differently.

You know, in the past when we sized the force and we did things to the force, we maintained pretty much a – we probably did not tinker as much with the AC, and we tinkered much more with the RC. So we created a wagging effect. Does that analogy help at all here, sir? And so what we realize now is, is that to go back to this defining of operational – if you're now expecting 30 to 40 percent of what could possibly be deployed, to be ready, I can't – not I. We can't create that kind of turbulence in the force now in the Reserve any longer. It cannot be tolerated because you've got to get them ready to go. You've got to get them duty MOSQ, you've got to get them the equipment, you've got to get it synchronized and all, and you've got to be prepared for them.

So there begins to be some curing of concrete because you're also then overlay that with the requirements to make sure they're ready for their homeland defense, homeland security missions. So we've walked into here, and as far as the percentage we're well on our way to better than 50 percent of rebalancing the force. And part of that rebalancing, a significant part of it was, is the deletion of what was the overstructure. We had better than 20,000-plus overstructure, both in the Army National Guard and the USAR. And so those were holes because the end strength, congressionally mandated, was only 350,000 for the Guard. So you automatically had 25,000 spaces which were what? Not built. You couldn't get there.

Then also you had the same thing on the USAR. You had 205 in their end strength, their force structure allowance was above 220, 225. So we brought that down. And now we're having spaces and spaces match up. That's a big deal. And we went to a TTHS account. We've now gone and we're going to allow the Guard to have a much

smaller TTHS account, and then I think the USAR wants to also reduce their TTHS account.

But now in the latest effort that I think, which is very, very important because we mentioned to what was the confluence of the QDR and the program review last January – not this last January, the past January of 06, in which we had a cutting of force structure in the Guard. We have walked hand in hand listening to the governors through their TAGs tell us the kind of force structure that they want as we now have begun to now try to execute what was in the QDR. And you know, we're at a phase line. This is a journey. But you know, we're getting there.

What I would do, sir, is at some point I'm – not the day before the commission's got to render its report but I think at some point what we could do is we could come back to you and tell you – because I haven't gotten this to the preliminary report. The rendering is exactly where we are through the new chief and to the acting secretary of the Army. But you know, I would hope that if you talk to the National Guard, I would think that they would at least give favorable marks. There's been give and take on both sides here.

There's got to be a natural tension. I need more CSCSS, and yet the governors want a little bit more combat arms. So we're trying to figure out a sweet spot here. We're working together. I recognize what are their responsibilities and we're listening. Mike is doing a great job, and he's bolstered by a great team, some of whom are HER (ph) officers that are working for him. That's kind of where we are.

MR. STOCKETON: Thank you, sir.

MR. PUNARO: Commissioner Gordon Stump.

MR. STUMP: Good morning. I'm going to follow up with just a couple of questions. General Huck, you indicated that – you answered one about how we're going to approach it in the National Guard, and this is deploying as units and not individuals, so you'll no longer take the people from tie-in's B and C to fill out A. What have you done to make sure that A is at 100 percent so you don't need those people from B and C?

GEN. HUCK: First of all, this policy direction, while it came out here in, I believe, the end of January, we had been talking with Marine forces Reserve and realized the problem of robbing Peter to pay Paul. And we have made sure that these organizations understand the effect that you get out of this cascading of personnel, and that while it fixes your immediate problem, it kills you in the long run. So it's a personnel policy that has to be known by everyone, and it goes down to the unit commanders of these battalions and squadrons to say, hey, you can't cherry-pick, you can't take people out of other units because you jeopardize them down the road.

So it's been an institutional education because many times, if left to your own devices without a policy in effect, you'll take the thing that fixes the – or kills the nearest alligator to the boat.

MR. STUMP: But where are you going to get the people. Are you going to take the IRR because you're probably not going to have 100 percent units across the board. You've got to fill them with somebody. I mean, General Lovelace indicated what we're trying to do in the National Guard, you know, I can see it's going to be years, two or three or four years before the National Guard can implement the policy of not doing some cross-leveling because of the force structure end-strength problem that we now have. And even with a 2,000-man TTHS account, it's probably not adequate because of the people that you have in MOS training, et cetera, that are not going to be available to do it.

So it sounds like a great idea, but the implementation of the idea looks to me like it's going to be extremely difficult.

GEN. HUCK: Sir, there's challenges with it, but the fact that you have a force generation plan that says battalion X and squadron Y, this is when you're going to be involved in whatever it is – OIF, OEF – it then gives them the ability to go after from the accession, whether it comes from prior service or whether it is done through the SMCR, to recruit to those units and to bring people in. When you have no plan and you have no direction and you have no prioritization, left to your own devices you will cascade the units. Or individuals to units.

MR. STUMP: General Lovelace, how is the Army approaching the dilemma?

GEN. LOVELACE: Sir, reference the IRR, ours is very much similar to the Marines. I will get you the exact numbers, but I'm about right in the numbers right now. We basically intend to mobilize – I think the number is about 6,700 right now, of which we have about 3,000 on active duty, right. Or had 3,000 on active duty. I know we have a cumulative number is what we're doing.

It's interesting. I understand what the intent historically has been of the IRR. I think this is one of those things that we need to step back and assess. These are great people who – you know, in the continuum of service it gives you an option how you want to serve your country. So how do you preserve the goodness of that and then marry that up now with the requirements to generate the force. So we have to now figure this out.

I'm not sure that it's broken, or that we just need to now attend to it in ways and ensure the readiness of it because we're also having to recruit. Now this is about civil affairs. We're having to recruit for civil affairs units as we're filling them out. That's where we've used a lot of individuals because it makes – these are people who have – we can use their civilian skills in civil affairs. It's about three to one. For every one person we want to get, we have to recruit about three right now, just to get them so that the skill match-up, physical ability and all. So we use it, they fill holes. That's what the intended mission of it is.

So to get back to your point also about, you know, when will we be able to stop cross-leveling. The policy right now about – the previous policy of volunteerism has created this Swiss cheese effect, has created those holes in the units. And so what it means is that basically you have all these people in this unit, and while the flag might say I was mobilized four years ago, you now then look to the scatter diagram inside that unit, and gosh, some people got back last week. Some people haven't gone at all. And so it creates this challenge for us.

That's why I guess y'all are all wrestling with, you know, like whether it's equipping. How deep in readiness do you want to be? It's your Army. Because whatever you say about the Reserves then you want your entire Army to be that ready. And right now what the chief and the secretary are espousing – not espousing, but in response to the strategy, the national military strategy, is not only do I have to have a deployed force that's ready, I've got to have the next deployed force that's ready. So at some point we're going – it's just ugliness. We're in this metamorphosis, puberty here where we come out on the other side and everybody looks beautiful. But it's going to take some time right now for us to get there.

People have to understand that friction and be able to now steel themselves to it because inside of these formations, these four Guard brigades that are going to be mobilized here between December of this year and April-May of next year. I mean, we've got to work our way through it, and that's why then commanders on the ground with the hardship authorities, with hardship cases we have the authority to now begin to work their way through it. So it's going to take some time.

That's why one of the things that we're trying to do is go so hard after getting duty MOSQ, making sure we have enough equipment so we can at least train people. It might not be the equivalent that you have with you to take overseas because we can give that to you when you get there. I mean, that's basically the strategy they were trying to go at. This is a challenging time. We'll get through them. We're going to get through them together.

MR. STUMP: I'm sure the next four brigades will have to have some cross-leveling, obviously, because we're not there yet.

GEN. LOVELACE: Sir, we want to try to minimize it as much as we can, but again, I'm a realist.

MR. STUMP: The thing that we've been looking into is the homeland security mission, and it looks like there's so much priority putting on the away game that we don't get a lot of priority on the homeland security mission. The Army measures the readiness of the National Guard units for the away game, or the federal mission. What are you doing, or are you considering doing an assessment of the readiness for the homeland security mission, especially those units which may be left behind, with lack of equipment, et cetera.

GEN. LOVELACE: You're exactly right. Our readiness system basically measures you against your war-fighting – when you have a table of organization, it gives you a mission, it gives you a war-fighting mission. That's the thing that we have to measure ourselves against. But I think conceptually there are opportunities. Right now, for example, if you're deploying overseas and you're a field artillery unit that's getting ready to go be an MP unit, what you do is you're measuring yourself against – your effectiveness against that mission that you're assigned. Why can't we do the same thing with homeland defense, homeland security? I really think that we can.

We're starting to not feebly walk that way, but we're walking that way when we're talking about at least the equipment. Then somehow we have to – that's why earlier, you know, at the higher level we talked about a chain of command. But conceptually we have to understand how we're going to do this. Right now what you have is you have 54 combatant commanders, for the lack of a better term, who then have their concept. But very few things are going to manifest itself and stay within the boundaries of a single state. I think that we have to get our way.

There's just a mature way to walk our way through this so that we can understand how to do this because what you do want are those units that are in one, two, three, four of the force generation to be able to now tell us how ready they are to do, that's right, your war-fighting mission, but at the same time to tell us, you know, whether you're capable of doing, you know, what it is that the government might ask you to do. And in most cases the two Venn diagrams do not perfectly overlay, but most of the tasks, if it's drive a truck, you've got to be able to drive a truck. If it's medical, then you've got to – or it's decontamination – you see what I'm saying, sir?

So there's a tremendous, seemingly from my perspective, that war-fighting mission, your war-fighting mission in accordance to your table of organization equipment, pretty much gives you most of the stuff that you're supposed to be able to do because you can do a mission. Not perfect but I think we can pretty much get there. And that's why I think we have a level of comfort when we say you're ready to do your mission. Or somebody's uncomfortable because you don't have all your equipment, or you're not duty MOSQ, you say I'm not ready to do my mission. That's conceptually how we're trying to eat this apple right now.

MR. STUMP: One just quick question. Could either of you give me a quick assessment of your IMA program, how effective it is and what changes you think need to be made to it, if any?

GEN. HUCK: It's absolutely critical to what we do because the IMA's have such skill levels, and many times you don't find on the active component side of the house. IMA's are one of the things that really stress United States Marine Corps, all the requirements for them.

Just for an example. I said the coin of the realm for many of your headquarters, OIF and the OEF, are field grade officers, staff planners, all right. So they want majors and they want lieutenant colonels. If you go and look at an infantry battalion, Reserve or active, in the Marine Corps, there are three field grade officers in that battalion – the commanding officer, the executive officer, and the Ops O. And if someone comes to you and says, I need an IMA, a major, and oh, by the way your operations officer is fine, you can see the effect that that has on the unit. Either a captain has to step up because you're not going to get another major.

That's why we go to the IMA piece of it and the IRR, to get people to serve as augmentments. And many of whom – I think Mr. Stockton talked about the low density, high demand. That's what kills you. It's the intel people that you need, the civil affairs people, that you don't have standing formations of or the resident knowledge. And when we talk about this end-strength increase, if you looked at our list of what we want in that 22K, a lot of it is non-traditional. It is the units and people that form the low density, high demand military occupational specialists. Does that answer your question?

GEN. LOVELACE: Sir, let me just qualify here one thing on your earlier question about the readiness reporting. It appears that General Baum has a readiness reporting system for homeland defense and it's a qualitative assessment by the TAGs on the various operating systems needed by the states, and so there is a – he does have one there specifically for homeland defense, homeland security.

MR. STUMP: The IMA's?

GEN. LOVELACE: IMA, sir, and I'm assuming you're talking about the mobilization augmentees here, is what you're basically talking about. You know, I have lived with that as a – I'm really not – I'm going to be very careful here because I'm going to talk in general terms here. We have allowed ourselves to what essentially are – (inaudible) – our staffs in all, and then at points in time when we go to war we want individual augmentees to come in. Now what I think is, we need to step back and understand where we want to use that human resource, all right, and let's decide whether it's an individual mobilization augmentees or not. Because these are people that have skill sets that we can richly use. Let's decide where we want to use them.

I think that as we go to wartime staffing then perhaps we can bring them in. We have – I've got inside – I don't. On the operations center, the nerve center of the United States Army, if you all ever come to the Pentagon you just need to see this. We have got this wonderfully dedicated, 130-plus people organization. They're Reservist. They are essentially the nerve center. When I go to sleep at night, it is not my brain that's functioning. It's theirs.

But getting back to your point, I guess I would back away, defer to Mr. James this afternoon. But I would walk into it a little bit now as we're looking at everything, whether it's individual – the IRR, all these other programs. Is that a Cold War relic or nt. And I think that's why you're asking the question thoughtfully. I would defer and answer

to him. But I know that what the MNRA has been asked to take on, what do we want the IRR to look like, what level of readiness do we want to have it in, and some of those are where you find those IMA's.

MR. STUMP: Thank you very much, and thank you for your thoughtful answers. It's going to be very helpful to us.

MR. PUNARO: Commissioner Brownlee.

MR. BROWNLEE: I'll quickly get through these. I know we're on your time now. General Lovelace, in your statement you indicated that one of your three major hurdles was that you needed improved mobilization policy and implementation guidance to allow you assured and predictable access to Reserves. Could you tell us what statutory and policy –

GEN. LOVELACE: Sir, let me clarify when I said that what I meant. Because as everything has to get through first off OSD, legal, and then OMB legal, I could see that I did not write clearly enough, right, for this moment in time. And they were asking if I recognized the secdef's memo of 19 January. I was there when it was born so I kind of understood the intent.

What I meant by that was, and that's why I walk into my opening statement. We're at this point in time when we're taking very historic elements of our nation. The National Guard's history goes back centuries, the USAR, this Army, and we're trying to now shape it for the future because – when I say y'all are shaping 55 percent of the United States Army. And so all I wanted to do was, as we have walked – I think Mr. McKinnon was asking but is the Army large enough, and I tried to give a very political answer, the answer to a very politically charged question, is that basically now what you've got to have is you've got to have this access to the Reserves. But then understanding is that a determination about how often in this long war that can be generational, you know, do you want the AC to be larger. If you want to have the RC do, or if you only want the RC to do a one rotation in the career. Thoughtfully we have to work our way to this.

But right now the capacity of the Army, it's essential that we have assured access. That's all I was trying to say by that statement. If assured access – meaning by that you can't get to them but, you know, at 1 and 5, or even if you went to 1 to 10 or 1 to 20, then the AC at this point in time, with the demands that are being placed operationally, you'd have to go to the AC hugely, and it would be expensive. That's what I was trying to get at.

MR. BROWNLEE: Would you just maybe consult when you get back, and if there are any policies or legislative changes that you all think are essential to your mobilization, would you just provide them for the record?

GEN. LOVELACE: Sir, and I think Mr. James this afternoon, he'll be – he can key right in on those.

MR. BROWNLEE: General Huck, did you have anything to add to that? The Marine Reserve is pretty much available to you, I believe.

GEN. HUCK: Yes, sir, and as I said before, these policy adjustments that came out through Secretary Gates have helped us immensely. You know, I would pose the thought that we should be looking at those six points, I believe, that he made in this memo, and asking how's it going. And not forget that it happened on 19 January and then be done with it. Ask for a report card on how are you doing on dwelve now for the active component, how are you doing for dwelve on reserve component.

But the one thing I would bring up, and I was talking to Mr. Chairman before we started off is that the end strength increase for the Marine Corps is 22,000. It's going to take five years to grow that and to equip it and to build facilities for it and get the right number of recruiters to recruit people. So it's going to be a bumpy road and it's not fixed right now. The stresses that you well know about on the forces still exist. But now we have, you know, a future that looks promising. We haven't fixed it yet.

MR. BROWNLEE: General Lovelace, you mentioned that access to the USAR and the National Guard. We've had some discussions here on the commission. I'm not sure how serious they are but the Marine Corps has one reserve component, the Army has two. Would there be any advantage to looking at simplifying this and rolling them both into one reserve component?

GEN. LOVELACE: Sir, I've seen the question. I mean, again, I walked back into what is the origins for what is a USAR versus a National Guard. They serve different purposes. And as you walk your way forward in understanding, it's like I said, it's not just – in this case it's not what you want your next – the volunteer force, is it the right volunteer force now. It's what you want your reserve components to be in the future. And so in this case we can do things with the USAR that we cannot do with the National Guard. It's the shaping function, it's how we – not that we train and equip them but also how we structure them. So the things that allow us to be done here with that federal part of the force that we cannot do right now based upon what is in law. Not complaining, it's just that we have latitudes that we don't have on the other side.

So it gives us flexibility from my perspective as a G-3. It gives me flexibility into how I manage the force and as I then be able to address risk in the force, in the size of the force.

MR. BROWNLEE: Last question. The commission has an opportunity here as we complete our work to send a message to the American people, to the Congress, to the administration, to all those who are serving in the reserve components. Is there any message that you would identify as important, that we ought to consider here?

GEN. HUCK: I would say, I think we always have to say this is a long war, this is a long commitment. I remember the stump speech I had in Al-Anbar province to every unit that I saw out there. I said, do you realize that successful counter-insurgency operations take eight to ten years, a successful one? And we're not going to solve it. We're just a piece of it. We're doing our part of this.

And I would go back to how you opened on thanking the American public for Marines. I just call them Marines. Where you come from I don't particularly care. And this is brought home to me particularly in Al-Anbar when one-third of my Marines were soldiers. One brigade combat team, who happened to be from 228 BCT from Pennsylvania. And the 224th engineers from Burlington, Iowa that were Army Reserve. And 325, 3rd battalion, 25th Marines from Brook Park, Ohio. And just told them that – I would tell people that it's a total force. When I came in 36 years ago, that was BS. There was active component and there was reserve component. Neither one could exist without the other right now. And that's what I would tell the people.

GEN. LOVELACE: Sir, my statement would be very simple. This is a team effort. A big part of the team. This nation needs them. And they are joining one of the most heralded institutions in the world, that is part of the United States Army.

MR. BROWNLEE: Thank you, and thank you for your service.

MR. PUNARO: We've got just a little bit more time. I know there's one or two commissioners that have a second round, but before we do that, are there any commissioners that haven't asked a question that would like to ask one before we get to the second round?

Okay, seeing none, I have a quick question, and that is –

GEN. LOVELACE: Sir, are we wearing you all out now?

MR. PUNARO: No. No, we're going to be here all day.

As the G-3's, you all keep track of what units would be employed for the execution of various combatant commander op plans and a lot of these op plans are long-standing. They're refined every year and there's a real good feel. For example, let's take the one that deals with contingencies on the Korean peninsula. From my personal experience, if something happened there, generally speaking the op plan identifies for the services which units are going to go, how they flow, et cetera. Fourth Marine division, I knew which of my regiments had to show up in Camp Lejeune and Camp Pendleton on which day, et cetera. Is that still the case, for example, for the op plan for any contingency on the Korean peninsula, that you as the 3's generally, you know what's required and who's going to go and when?

GEN. HUCK: Yes, sir.

MR. PUNARO: Is that true in the Army, General Lovelace?

GEN. LOVELACE: Yes, sir, it is.

MR. PUNARO: So let me ask you that debate –

GEN. LOVELACE: Now as you say that, sir, you've got to remember that we are basically following through, either in the United States Army, and the Marine Corps also, you're either deployed or you're getting ready to deploy.

MR. PUNARO: Right. Understand.

GEN. LOVELACE: And so when you're talking about tip-fitting (ph) units now, I mean – because you're talking about certain op plans that require – your point is valid, is that there are certain op plans that require that level of granularity and detail.

MR. PUNARO: But this is, for example, an op plan that's highly refined and it's not like there's any question about how many regiments are needed and how many squadrons are needed, and how many combat support are needed, things of that nature.

GEN. LOVELACE: We've got the granularity.

MR. PUNARO: Okay, you've got the granularity. Now, contrast that potentially. This is for the Army. If a major earthquake occurred on the New Madras fault, would the NORTHCOM op plan be as detailed for Army units, including the Guard units?

GEN. LOVELACE: Sir, you know the answer to that. I mean, there is not one there.

MR. PUNARO: What was that again, sir? I did not hear. There's not one. Is that what you said?

GEN. LOVELACE: There's not one there.

MR. PUNARO: Okay, that takes care of that issue.

GEN. LOVELACE: But on the other hand, I think to your point, those are the kind of things that can be very, very helpful. Sir, when you think about it, this is – when we look at – and that's why then I would offer that what you all need to take a look at is what is designing the capabilities that then, and the strategy, you know, what are the defense planning scenarios that are being used? Is it manifesting the kinds of requirements? Are they realistic?

Katrina came right at a crescendo moment inside the QDR. It was a very terrible, unfortunate event, but also it manifested itself in what was a very obvious kind of real

quality to a requirement about what it could mean. So I would offer, I think that's one of the things that you all need to do, is take a look at. Because those things build capacity.

You know, we – but I want to walk you this way. Once you get past a certain op plan, so there's not the level of detail like you're talking about with the tip-fid (ph) level of detail. I mean, we have op plans that essentially have con-ops, and then there are those that even have less granularity. And so as we walk into – that's why the ability now to predict whether you're going to be in Pakistan – who would have thought we'd be in Pakistan and at the same time be able to handle an earthquake and support? It wasn't large but it was a sizeable contingent. And very, very important.

So our ability to now exactly determine where we're going, that's why then our institutions are trying to be as agile, and I would say the Marines stole it from us and that we're trying to be expeditionary, is that what we want to be able to do is show that we can move to where we need to be when required. And we're not somebody who is now stodgy and just going to fight two conflicts. No. We've got to be wherever the nation needs us, whether it's in the fault line of or a fire of or a hurricane or something even more traumatic like a weapons of mass destruction.

MR. PUNARO: General Huck?

GEN. HUCK: Sir, I would just also add, and you know this, the COCOM plans that are out there, it's not like the units that are supposed to go against the forces assigned against a Korea scenario are sitting around doing nothing.

MR. PUNARO: That's correct.

GEN. HUCK: They are some other place doing something else. So you know, the enemy gets a vote in all of this and he gets to decide the tempo, and we have units that are dual, triple tasked.

MR. PUNARO: That's right. My question really was not about the availability of the units. It was about the granularity of the plan, and I think we've got that. Real quickly then –

GEN. LOVELACE: Sir, if I could. See, that's why – I'm sorry. I don't mean to –

MR. PUNARO: That's all right. No, go ahead. No, this is important.

GEN. LOVELACE: That's why – I don't mean it's just in a nascent stage, but that's why when I talk about the rock drill that we are doing down at Belvoir, it becomes a big deal because we've got NORTHCOM there, we've got AR north (ph), we've got National Guard, we've got FEMA there. We've got all these institutions who are coming together and working in an interagency way on a problem, that whether it manifests itself or not – I mean, there's goodness in that. Because we want to make sure that we can get

the assets there, understand, you know. But all I'm trying to do is reinforce your point about that point.

MR. PUNARO: Right. Well, that's encouraging to hear about that meeting. Second thing about it – and again, I want to get a little bit of a philosophical answer on the use of the IRR, the role of the IRR. I need to put my biases up front as the former CG of the Marine Corps mobilization command, so I have some familiarity with the Marine Corps, not a lot with the Army. But the IRR when it was a strategic reserve was viewed primarily for battlefield casualty replacement. That was the purpose of maintaining people in the Individual Ready Reserve.

General Huck, in your particular job you really shouldn't know these numbers but maybe you do. What roughly is the size of the Marine Corps IRR right now?

GEN. HUCK: Sixty thousand.

MR. PUNARO: About 60,000, about where it's been in the past. Now, my understanding in the recent potential call-up of the 1,200, but you were mustering roughly 1,800, you ruled out the people that had just come off on active duty. Hypothetically that would be the people in year five because let's say typically you serve four years on active duty, you still have four years remaining on your obligation. So you rule out year five, and you rule out the people in the last year, the eighth year, because if you called them up there wouldn't be enough time. And essentially if you called them up, you'd be stop-lossing them from getting out of their obligation. So you targeted the six to seven-year point.

How many are in that pool, the six to seven-year point?

GEN. HUCK: I will have to get back to you, sir. I don't know exactly. But you're absolutely right. Our policy, if we don't go after the IRR in the fifth year of their total obligation, nor the eighth year.

MR. PUNARO: But the 1,800, to get 1,200, the philosophy is what? Those are individual replacements for specific billets? Are those for filling out units that are deploying, or what's the purpose? I know they're not casualty replacements for the most part.

GEN. HUCK: That is correct, sir. Matter of fact, here's where they're going. They're going to the CENTCOM, doing staff, they're going to NMFI in Baghdad, MNCI, the Corps headquarters in Baghdad. They're going to 2MEF (ph) forward in Falujah. They're going to the RCT's, the two Marine regimental combat teams, the Marine air group, the Marine logistics group, and down to the battalions. Because as you know, our tables of organization are not built for 24-hour a day –

MR. PUNARO: So they're filling holes. They're really individual augments.

GEN. HUCK: That's right. And also the mobile training –

MR. PUNARO: The MTT's.

GEN. HUCK: The MTT's, the police training teams and the border training teams.

MR. PUNARO: Okay. So that 1,200, what window of time are they – in other words, is that for just this next rotation and then the next time you're going to have to go for another 1,200, then another 1,200? What's the –

GEN. HUCK: This group of 1,200 is to be utilized by October, sir. We have already had a call-up of 150 that took place, I believe in January or February. But this –

MR. PUNARO: And they're going to be called up for 18 months?

GEN. HUCK: No, they're going to be called up I think for 18 – or excuse me, for 12 months, exempting their training time and the demobilization time.

MR. PUNARO: But that could be a couple of months on either end of that.

GEN. HUCK: Yes, sir.

MR. PUNARO: So 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, so 16 months possible.

GEN. HUCK: Yes.

MR. PUNARO: So that's really a tranche (?) for the force that's employed right now. So it sounds to me like you're going to need roughly that same amount for all the future rotations.

GEN. HUCK: That's correct. But you know, we don't know how long.

MR. PUNARO: But you're replenishing that. You don't know how many are in that 6 to 7-year pool, but in theory it gets replenished every year because the Marine Corps discharges about 30,000 people every year.

GEN. HUCK: Yes, sir. Then you have the people that come out of the SMCR that could do six years in the SMCR, and by our own policy would have two years remaining, of which we wouldn't use them because it would be their fifth and eighth year, if you would.

MR. PUNARO: I think one thing that's important to understand about the IRR is, there are people in the IRR that don't realize they have a continuing obligation. These are not people that joined a Reserve unit. You don't join the IRR. You're in it because you have an eight-year obligation and it's just a pool that you're in when you come off of

active duty, or you come off of Reserve duty. It's not something you elect to join. You don't volunteer into the IRR, is that correct?

GEN. HUCK: That's correct, sir.

MR. PUNARO: Gen. Lovelace, what's roughly the size of the Army IRR?

GEN. LOVELACE: Sir, I'll get you the exact figures, but off the top of my head it's about 100,000 people that we have. I mean, that's a rough order of magnitude.

MR. PUNARO: How current do you think the Army's knowledge of where these people are located are, how many do you actually think you could get ahold of if you had to?

GEN. LOVELACE: Sir, I mentioned this earlier. This strategy right now is for every one we go after about three. That's the return right now that we're getting.

MR. PUNARO: How many of the Army's IRR have been used since 9/11, do you know?

GEN. LOVELACE: Oh, since 9/11? I could back up on that. I'll forewarn Mr. James now. But I have it. I have the number. That's why I gave you – the rough numbers that I – I see them once a month. We give them to the secretary of the Army and the Chief and the vice once a month at a briefing, and the numbers that I remember most recently were 6,700 alerted to be mobilized, and then it's about 3,000-plus that are on active duty at this time.

MR. PUNARO: I should know this but I don't. Obviously people that are coming off active duty that haven't completed an eight-year obligation to go, people in the Army Reserve. The people in the Guard go in the IRR? In other words, if they don't serve an eight-year obligation are they in the IRR?

GEN. LOVELACE: Sir, I will make sure that Mr. James can answer that question for you.

MR. PUNARO: All right. I know Dan's got a question. What I took away, though, what I heard you say is, we ought to step back and take a look at the really role of the IRR because I mean, it was designed for casualty replacements, for a strategic war with the Soviet Union. That's really why you have the IRR.

GEN. LOVELACE: Sir, and I think that's what we're both saying because as he talked about where he uses the IRR, that's basically what the Marines do. That's basically what we are using. I gave a larger example reference civil affairs. We still use them all to fill out, flesh out these teams.

MR. PUNARO: But these are not people that volunteered to serve in the Reserve. These are people that elected to be inactive, and so they are being called up to serve again, not because they volunteered but because they just happened to have time remaining on their obligation. I mean, that's a fact. There's no getting around that.

GEN. LOVELACE: Well, sir, that would be – I would offer the counter-view is that they did volunteer. When they signed their obligation for a mandatory service obligation, they did volunteer for it.

MR. PUNARO: They volunteered for four years of active duty and they by virtue of that –

GEN. LOVELACE: That's now how – they understand what their obligation is up front. I mean, I've got young men who have had this opportunity to serve –

MR. PUNARO: They do up front, but by the time they come off active duty – trust me as somebody that's had to muster them over the years and they show up, you're kidding, I'm still in? I mean, it's part of this education.

But we ought to step back and think about – because you're basically saying your using the IRR now is basically a contingent manpower pool in the Marine Corps. You're using it because you have billets you can't fill from the active duty, or from the Reserve, or from your recruiting establishment. So you're going to the Individual Ready Reserve to fill hard-core requirements that you have for your units that are deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan.

GEN. HUCK: Absolutely. Back to my three field grade officers, take them out of the active component, the SNCR? No.

MR. PUNARO: I'm not saying that's wrong. I'm just saying that –

GEN. HUCK: Absolutely required.

MR. PUNARO: Okay. Commissioner McKinnon. Close out.

MR. McKINNON: I have just one quick one on the IRR. Would it be better off to have – your field grade officers is where you mentioned your hole is. Would you be better off to have them stay on six years active duty and forget the IRR? Or have the four and four?

GEN. HUCK: I'd have to think about that one, sir, and get back to you on that.

MR. McKINNON: All right. Well, that would be great if you would. We'd appreciate it. General Lovelace, you're dealing with the combatant commanders, they want a certain amount of troops and you have to figure out how to supply them and where they come from. The next group that's coming up, do they talk to you – and the

group even after that, do they talk to you about shortages of equipment? Your combatant commanders wants another batch of troops to come up from the Guard or Reserve --

GEN. LOVELACE: I think if I understand your question, in the battle rhythm of what we do, basically the way this comes to me, first off we basically manage the force on a quarterly basis in a general sense. I get the requirements in bulk load to me on a quarterly sense, although they come to me every day in what is called the request for forces that can come from any combatant commander that we address. And then we manage it.

First off it's validated, and then it's validated before it gets to me, and hopefully prioritized by the Joint Staff as it comes down then to us in the Army. So that's how we manage it in the Aegis. So I know what the requirements are. Then what we do is that we, for the vice chief of staff, once a month we basically lay out the readiness of what are the deployed and the deploying forces that include then the large units. Because as you know, we have 4,500 units report readiness. It's hard then to get into the Aegis. So some of those, especially as you get into smaller units, smaller elements, then we have to deal with them in bulk. But we do manage the readiness.

Before a unit can deploy, we have certain policies. You have to be P-1 – C-1, P-1, C-2, P-2. I mean, these are things that you can deploy. P-1, C-1 is combat, C-2, P-2 is CSCSS. So they have to be that. Or it comes to me as a 4-by (ph) exception. So we have along the way we have a rhythm for decision-making and standards by which units then must meet before they can deploy.

MR. McKINNON: Okay, well, let's approach it another way. You have all these units that are reporting whatever their readiness level is. Do you have any that are reporting below a C-3 then?

GEN. LOVELACE: Sir, if I could, I'm getting into some classified data. I'm not trying to dodge the question. I can handle it in an offline way. Would that be okay?

MR. McKINNON: We're really interested in trying to be sure that you all have equipment you need and we report back to the Congress.

GEN. LOVELACE: Sir, I'm not – and again, the question's valid. I accept the question. I'm just concerned that in a public forum when I start dealing with overall – we can provide you that kind of classified data that I think would be very helpful to you and we'd be happy to do that.

MR. McKINNON: Okay, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MR. THOMPSON: I just wanted one definition. What does rock mean?

GEN. LOVELACE: Sir, when we say a rock drill, basically what it is that – I should have been more clear. It is essentially a rehearsal of an event, and everybody

who has responsibilities as you go through a timeline – say, for example, a hurricane approaching the east coast, at this point what’s starting to happen then. Everybody has to report their actions so you can see the synergy and the coordination that must occur, and then you see the movement of equipment and people to what will be the staging areas to then assist in the aftermath of an event.

MR. THOMPSON: Is this exercise part of the 15 scenarios the Department of Homeland Security has developed? That exercise one of those?

GEN. LOVELACE: Sir, if I could, I’m not familiar with the 15 scenarios of the homeland security has developed. I would hope that somehow it captures the core. If I could take it for the record, I’d be happy to get with you.

MR. PUNARO: Let me thank our two witnesses for their extremely helpful, informative and enlightening testimony here this morning. But most importantly, because they’re well known to most of us here on the commission, I know that in the execution of their day-to-day jobs, where they are the recipients of all these difficult and challenging requirements, foremost in their minds when they’re making those decisions is, doing them in a way that takes maximum consideration of our soldiers, Marines and their families and the impact of their decisions on them. Both of them would rather be out in the field, but they’re doing a tremendous service to the nation and have for many years. Thanks again for your service, and we look forward to continuing to work with you closely as we wrestle with some of these issues for the future.

So we’ll recess. I’ll ask commissioners to take kind of an individual break so we can get right to the next panel and I’ll get the opening statements going and stay on schedule. Thanks again.

(End of panel.)