

**THE COMMISSION ON
THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES**

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WASHINGTON, D.C.**

PANEL 1

WITNESS:

**GENERAL JAMES JONES,
U.S. MARINE CORPS,
SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE**

*Transcript by:
Federal News Service
Washington, D.C.*

MR. DAWSON: (Strikes gavel.) This hearing will come to order. Welcome to the sixth set of public hearings of the independent Commission on the National Guard and Reserves. As you know, the commission was chartered by Congress to identify and recommend changes in law, policy, practice to ensure that the National Guard and Reserves are tasked, organized, trained, equipped, compensated and supported to best meet the national security requirements of the United States, now and in the future.

We regret that our chairman, Arnold Punaro, our good friend, cannot be here today to chair these proceedings. Unfortunately he had other, unavoidable commitments. We are most fortunate to have the opportunity to hear testimony today from two of our nation's most respected combatant commanders, whose outstanding leadership, broad scope of military experience, expertise and vision can greatly contribute to the commission's work.

Our first witness today is General James Logan Jones, who currently serves as the commander of the U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe. He is the first Marine to serve as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and has experienced an intensely challenging but highly successful tenure as SACEUR.

Before taking on the profound responsibilities of a combatant command and NATO's top military post, General Jones served as the 32nd commandant of the United States Marine Corps. Many of us on the commission have had the privilege of knowing General Jones for many, many years. He is a great leader, distinguished public servant, devoted patriot, outstanding Marine, and a good and dear friend. The nation is very fortunate to have General Jones's leadership, and we are very grateful for his lifelong service and that of his family, including his wife and two of his sons, Kevin and Jim, who are here with us today.

General Jones, welcome, and thank you for taking the time out of your exceedingly busy schedule to join us today.

Later this morning we will hear testimony from Air Force General Lance Smith, commander of the U.S. Joint Forces Command, who is a highly distinguished military leader with a wealth of experience of great value to our work as a commission.

This hearing follows the commission's very successful visit to San Diego, where we conducted public hearings, field visits and round- table discussions with the troops and commanders, focusing on issues of readiness, training and equipping relative to National Guard and Reserves.

Witnesses at our San Diego hearing told us:

First, the method for equipping and funding the Guard and Reserve is dysfunctional, particularly now that we have shifted from a strategic to an operational Reserve.

Second, the shortage of equipment compounded by ongoing operations is increasingly harmful to the effectiveness of training and Reserve troop readiness.

Third, the mobilization process requires significant improvements.

Fourth, full-time support personnel levels need to be evaluated and fully funded.

Fifth, policies that lead -- that -- to cannibalizing personnel and equipment assigned to one unit in order to fill out shortages in others, a practice known as cross-leveling, is a major issue that must be addressed.

Next, the Army Force Generation Model of deploying one year in five or one year in six may be workable, but the details are not clear yet.

Finally, training time needs to be increased and used more efficiently to better prepare troops for the operations that they will be undertaking and the real threats they will face in theater.

Those were some of the comments that we heard in San Diego, and the commission was able to talk candidly with a wide variety of service personnel, both officers and enlisted. We received powerful, public testimony, and we also had the opportunity to receive the unvarnished input of front-line personnel from all seven Reserve components in round-table discussions. We were struck not only by their patriotism, but also by their desire to serve. They provided many keen and helpful insights.

One of the most compelling is that many believe that their predeployment training was mostly inefficient, often irrelevant and generally insufficient. While training commanders testified that training has improved with lessons learned, this is an area which the commission is looking closely.

I want to thank all of the commissioners for their hard work in making our San Diego visit such a success.

Today's hearing will allow us to pick up where we left off in San Diego and hear from combatant commanders responsible for accessing and utilizing ready and highly capable forces, including Reserve component personnel and units to meet their peacetime and wartime requirements. As commander of EUCOM, General Jones has one of the most if not the most diverse and far-flung commands in the U.S. military. He commands U.S. forces in the area of responsibility that covers more than 21 million square miles, includes over 90 countries and territories on four continents and has more than 1.4 billion inhabitants. Both within his EUCOM area of responsibility and as top military commander of NATO troops, including those serving in Afghanistan, General Jones is on the frontline of the global war on terror and can offer unique insights and perspectives on the evolving national security environment and the role of the Guard and Reserves.

As commandant, General Jones was a leader who took numerous steps to fully integrate the Reserves, to include dropping the word "Reserves" from operational units. He put Reserve personnel on the drill fields at Parris Island and San Diego, and he took great steps to ensure all Marines are considered the same.

We look forward to hearing his views on how well the capabilities of the U.S. military are in general and the Reserve component in particular, and how they are keeping pace with national security requirements and where improvements must be made; what challenges he has experienced in accessing and utilizing -- and successfully utilizing Reserve component forces, and how these obstacles can be overcome; what he believes are the challenges of transitioning from a strategic Reserve to a more operational force and how we can best meet them; how we can better qualify Reserve component personnel and units to operate jointly; and what needs to be done to promote a sustainable, integrated, total force able to meet national security requirements now and well into the future.

We would also be deeply interested, General Jones, in whether you believe other countries within the NATO alliance can offer us useful concepts and lessons learned on how best to organize and maintain a sustainable Reserve component, and, of course, other insights and recommendations you would offer relevant to the commission's charter.

Again, we are deeply grateful for your taking the time to join us today. We look forward to your testimony. And again, thank you and your family for your life-long service and outstanding leadership on behalf of our country.

General Jones, do you have a statement that you would like to make?

GEN. JONES: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for your very, very kind words. And it is a pleasure to be here in front of this commission to talk about the Guard and Reserve aspects related to the Central -- to the European Command.

I just have a brief statement that I'd like to make, and then perhaps I could respond to any questions that you might have.

As you know, EUCOM and the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance are undergoing significant transformation aimed at increasing our strategic effectiveness to meet the challenges of the 21st century. Like EUCOM and NATO, the Commission on the Guard and Reserves has undertaken an examination of the best options for reform to keep pace with the changing global security environment.

The commission's mandate to review the wide spectrum of how the National Guard and Reserves are tasked, organized, trained, equipped and compensated in order to meet the national security needs of the United States is an essential requirement for a thorough transformation and a ready force in the future. We must absolutely ensure that our Reserve components remain prepared to address the ever-changing security landscape.

Reserve component forces are ever-present across EUCOM's 92- country area of responsibilities. The key aspect of EUCOM's overall strategy is a robust theater security cooperation program through which we proactively engage to help prevent conflict. This strategy helps us enhance the military capacities of our partner nations. The many skill sets and capabilities resident in the Guard and Reserves are of significant importance to the success of our theater security cooperation programs. Reserve component personnel deployed throughout the region significantly contribute to EUCOM's mission by fully integrating into critical roles -- command and control, airlift, airborne tankers, engineering, force protection, special operations and intelligence.

Each day we are fortunate to have an average of about 4,500 Reserve and Guard personnel serve in the EUCOM AOR. Simply put, the Reserve component plays a vital role in support of the EUCOM mission today, and it will continue to be that way in the future.

Members of the Reserve components make up over 10 percent of the uniformed personnel of the European Command Headquarters. They provide not only their military expertise across all staff directorates, but also bring unique skill sets and important relationships outside the Department of Defense. They are an important part of the synchronization process required to effectively lead a command with a variety of tasks that EUCOM is assigned. As you're well aware, EUCOM is a major hub for a throughput of troops and equipment deploying forward to the Central Command's AOR. Reserve and Guard members are managing logistics requirements, flying airlift missions and operating on air fields and imports to keep the flow of personnel and materials moving forward.

As an example, EUCOM recently augmented with Reserve component forces, provided considerable support to Joint Task Force Lebanon and the resulting evacuation operation. EUCOM's established relationships and infrastructure provided the logistical, political, military and commercial capabilities to help ensure that the NEO was in fact a success.

Theater intelligence assets are also highly dependent on the tremendous analytical skills that our Reserve component members bring to the command. There are a combined total of over 560 Reserve and Guard members currently supporting EUCOM Joint Intelligence Operations Center, Intelligence Mission Operations Center and the Joint Analysis Center. Reserve component members at the JAC, the Joint Analysis Center, produce more than 30 percent of the intelligence products provided in support of operations throughout the command.

Many of our exercise-related construction projects across the AOR are engineered and built by Guard and Reserve units. The 235th civil engineering flight from Maryland Air National Guard deploys to Israel annually in support of our Juniper Stallion series of exercises. They have provided resounding continuity covering numerous construction projects with this important ally. Additionally, the contributions made by the National Guard and Army Reserve engineering units at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center at Grafenwoehr, Germany, in tandem with engineers from Azerbaijan and Estonia, resulted in a savings of \$3.6 million. These units rotated through on annual training status throughout 2006 constructing facilities for training in an urban environment.

Three companies of Army National Guard Military Policemen provide world-class force protection across several regions within Germany. These soldiers are fully engaged in community law enforcement activities, ensuring security and safety for our installations and our families, and their efforts allow vitally needed active duty forces to be used for other operations throughout the AOR.

Reserve component contributions aren't limited to EUCOM alone. Last year, a 35-man Special Operations attachment from the West Virginia Guard deployed in support of NATO's Rapid Reaction Forces, the new concept for expeditionary operations that is coming on-line in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Additionally, my headquarters in Belgium maintains a considerable Reserve component presence, supporting our intelligence efforts as we develop the Intelligence Fusion Cell, another transformational concept in the alliance, which is co-located at the Joint Analysis Center in Molesworth, England. This provides intelligence support to NATO's strategic and operational requirements within the Article 5 area of operations, as well as for International Security Assistance Force, otherwise known as ISAF, in Afghanistan.

Reserve component personnel provide staff support to every NATO Response Force steadfast exercise series of validation and certification events. Reservists currently serve as an integral core of the U.S. delegation to the NATO Military Committee in Brussels.

On the operational side, Air National Guard tankers provide the majority of airborne tanker support for NATO's AWACS aircraft, while the Air National Guard and Air Reserve provide lift support to United States Air Forces in Europe. Additionally, the Maritime Domain Awareness/White Shipping Tracking Cell, is entirely manned by reservists. National Guard and Reserve personnel provide significant U.S. leadership to NATO, and in so doing, strengthen the transatlantic relationship immeasurably.

Of incalculable benefit are the Reserve and Guard contributions to ongoing operational missions. The Reserve components are a major player in peacekeeping operations in the Balkans and in Africa. Bosnia and Kosovo operations are virtually exclusively executed by the Army National Guard and Army Reserve, with approximately 1,800 Guard and Reserve personnel serving in the Balkans, mostly in Kosovo. Guard and Reserve members also serve as mentors to the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program, known as ACOTA, providing valuable peacekeeping operations training to units from a number of African nations. The Reserve components are also an integral factor in a new initiative, the Maritime Partnership Program. Within this program, Navy Reservists work with countries in the Gulf of Guinea, the Black Sea and Caspian Sea Regions, assisting in building local maritime security procedures and protecting precious natural resources such as oil, gas and fishing.

Many of the humanitarian assistance programs in Eastern Europe and in Africa are manned by Reserve component personnel who are providing much-needed medical and dental care and assisting in land mine removal.

One program that provides tremendous returns on our efforts to build bilateral relationships is the State Partnership Program. I'd like to -- in addition to this slide, which shows the EUCOM Reserve components' operational highlights which I've just briefly discussed -- I'd like to show the

slide here that is really one of our most important contributions, graphically depicted here with the State Partnership Program that are an absolute -- a cornerstone of our theater security cooperation effort, otherwise known as engagement. This is where they're located, and, of course, the state and territorial flags associated with the countries.

There are 20 in the European land mass, in which -- even more significant, I think, is the next chart, which shows the evolution, and this is just in the last few years. In 2003, there were no programs in Africa, and we are now actively soliciting more State Partnership Programs to form one of the cornerstones of our theater security engagement in this emerging strategic interest that we have on this continent.

The unique program known as State Partnership Program brings together our National Guard leaders from a particular state to develop a relationship with specific countries, enhancing not only mil-to-mil contacts but also civilian-to-military contacts and civilian-to-civilian contacts. We currently have, as was shown on the slide, 20 of our states partnered with European nations and five partnered with nations in Africa. Our most recent partnership is with Nigeria and -- between Nigeria and the state of California. The criticality of engagement in Nigeria is certainly not lost on anyone in this commission.

The State Partnership Program has had a major impact on the transition of former Soviet bloc states into NATO or into associations with NATO and with coalition partners that assist in the global war on terrorism. I believe we can contribute the many successes -- we can attribute the many successes of democratization and transformation of these former Soviet militaries to the State Partnership Program.

The Reserve components are active in every aspect of EUCOM operations. Gone are the days when the Reserves and Guardsmen show up at our command in order to complete their two weeks of annual training. From conducting special ops to watchstanding, Reserve component forces are fully integrated in the daily EUCOM battle rhythm. They're assigned to critical positions and are essential in achieving EUCOM's theater goals.

As U.S. military in Europe and Africa transforms from a static, forward-deployed force to a more dynamic expeditionary force, I foresee numerous opportunities to increase the use of the Reserve and National Guard in innovative and resourceful ways during their annual training periods. Should EUCOM be given additional flexibilities and authorities with our resources, the Reserve component could be used even more effectively.

Examples of Reserve component support during these annual training periods that could be enhanced include medical units providing support at U.S. bases in Europe, engineer construction programs, infantry opposition forces -- known as OPFOR -- for predeployment training and exercises, Military Police Force security missions at U.S. bases, military intelligence analytical support to EUCOM and NATO, humanitarian assistance such as demining assessments and training, and military assistance to civil authorities, such as civil support teams.

I believe that a key benefit of your commission lies in its ability to address legislative restrictions, DOD policies and service processes that impede efforts to efficiently and effectively

employ these talented men and women. It's my sincere hope that the findings and recommendations of this commission will result in a more clearly defined and updated directive concerning Reserve component support to joint and coalition operational units. Directives which provide clear authority to the combatant commander and streamline funding provisions for such activities will advance the current management and employment processes of our Reserve component personnel.

In my view, there are two major initiatives that will improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Reserve components in their support of EUCOM's missions. First and foremost, our military needs a single integrated pay and personnel system for the active and Reserve components. Having separate pay and personnel system creates unnecessary complexities which significantly slow both the mobilization process and our ability to reach out to the Reserve component volunteers across all service lines on a day-to-day basis.

Secondly, I would suggest that the labyrinth of duty statuses for Reservists and Guardsmen serve as a major impediment to effectively and efficiently access operational and support forces. I believe we should strive within the Department of Defense to reduce the number of Reserve component duty statuses to improve operations and to achieve equality in pay and benefits with the active component personnel serving in EUCOM. The wide scope and unpredictable nature of this new security landscape compels us to develop new strategies to better harmonize the full spectrum of national influence. This harmonization should include maximizing the full potential of our Reserve components as a ready operational volunteer force, not just a strategic asset for mobilization.

Mr. Chairman, I deeply appreciate the invitation to appear before this commission and for your -- and you for allowing me to appear here today to provide my perspective on the National Guard and Reserve contributions to the United States European Command and NATO, and to contribute to the important work that constitutes such a crucial aspect to our nation's future security.

I'm prepared to answer any questions you might have. Thank you so much.

MR. DAWSON: Thank you, General Jones. Before we turn to my colleagues, let me ask you a couple of questions picking up on some of the strategic points that you made.

You talked a bit about the capabilities of the military in general and in particular the Reserve components, and how they're evolving to meet the national security requirements. And you also touched on how we could do better. I wonder if I might ask you to amplify a bit on how we can do better.

GEN. JONES: Well, thank you. Mr. Chairman, the -- in the current environment of the 21st century, which appears to be, at least for the foreseeable future, a century where the asymmetric nature of our -- of collective threats that face us argue for forces that are able to rapidly respond and to be immediately useful, we have to be prepared to deploy and to execute our missions in a very, very shortened time frame, and to be immediately effective.

As we in EUCOM have restructured the footprint of the U.S. European Command, we have focused on creating a force that is able not only to be more agile and more expeditionary, to include all components, but can also be more proactive throughout the AOR. That is to say that the days of the 20th century, where our forces generally sat in fixed cantonments, occasionally executing annual exercises that were predictable, we are now deploying across the AOR, especially with the increased emphasis on locations to the east and to the south of our traditional Western European footprint.

And we are shaping the entire United States European Command in order that they can be strategically more effective and employable. And that includes the Guard and Reserve units -- smaller, more lethal, more flexible, more mobile, but also more engaged. I think the major shift in our strategy in Europe is that we believe that proactive engagement is always cheaper than reactive engagement. You can't be everywhere at once, but if you pick your spots carefully, you can affect things with a small number of troops and a small tailored package in such a way that you can have strategic outcomes that are much more beneficial than sitting in a fixed base, waiting for an event to happen and then reacting to it.

Specifically, we are engaged with all of our units in North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa on a continual basis, with small-focus tailored units making amazing contributions to changing the security landscape of about nine North African and Sub-Saharan African countries who are becoming true partners and friends as we struggle to make sure that future Afghanistans and Iraqs won't materialize on the African land mass. The Guard and Reserve units participate in this, and participate in many, many ways. One of the most effective ways is the one that I just outlined here with the State Partnership Program.

In every mission that we execute, there is a Guard and Reserve component. I have cited some. But the unique expertise the Guard and Reserve units bring to Civil Affairs, Information Ops, and PsyOps, and many other aspects of our high-demand, low-density type capabilities that are in such precious supply, are absolutely critical to our future -- the execution of our future strategy.

The global war on terrorism will require every institution of the United States government and our coalition partners to triumph. Guard and Reserve units, with their unique capabilities, are part of the essential fabric that is knitting this together, not just as a reactive force, but as a proactive force that seeks to bring about very important strategic changes in our AOR before it becomes a critical -- before these incidents and events reach a critical mass.

MR. DAWSON: Thank you, General Jones.

And in the interest of time, I think I'll defer my questions and go on to my colleagues and remind them that we're going to be a little bit strapped for time. And so while we'll try to allow 10 minutes for questioning, that may not always work. And if you can use less time, that would be to everybody's advantage.

And I'm going to start with Commissioner Keane.

JOHN KEANE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Jim, it's great seeing you again.

GEN. JONES: Thanks, John.

MR. KEANE: And thanks for all your many, many years of service, and particularly your extraordinary leadership you've been providing these years. And it's been great knowing you and hanging around with you, frankly. Listen, in addition to the two initiatives you mentioned in your opening statement, I was wondering if there are one or two top priorities that you think this commission should be working on that -- you know, issues that may be troubling you, or issues that you think we should really place some emphasis on.

GEN. JONES: Well, I think, General, that one of the things I tried to bring out in my statement is that we really do depend on Guard and Reserve units. And I am in deep admiration for everything they bring, not only what they bring to the mission, but how they do it. I mean, they are immediately useable. So we're talking about a proven capability.

I always -- I always am in awe of walking out on a flight line, and the only way that you can tell whether it's a Guard or Reserve or an active unit using our Air Forces is by looking on the tail, because there's no other way -- you can't tell the difference.

The maturity that some of these forces bring, by virtue of their civilian experience, translates into our peacekeeping operations, the security operations in Kosovo, continues -- develops the international relations through the State Partnership Programs in ways that we can only sit back and watch in admiration.

So I would say that the answer to the question is that to the degree that there are any inequities in our system in terms of training, in terms of education, in terms of recognizing, rewarding the men and women who participate in the Guard and Reserve, we should attack those and we should defeat those.

I think creating a single personnel and manpower system and a simplification of our myriad of duty statuses would go a long way towards helping people like me understand how to better access and use the Guard and Reserve system. The pay and benefits for Reservists ought to be seamless with regard to Reserve to active duty and back. This is a very -- this is not an area that I'm particularly expert in except I do have a sense of how incredibly complicated it is. Title 10 law results in people doing the same job in the same place and getting different pay and benefits. That seems to be one of the inequities that I would try to attack and defeat.

So those kinds of things, General Keane, that you and I have faced and labored with. I think that I would add an overall comment that we shouldn't do anything that creates a division between the -- that results in a partition of active and Reserve forces. The -- I think the Army and the Air Force in particular where the Guard is concerned has got to be seen as one seamless force, and if we create separateness -- too much separateness, I think that attacks the cohesion and the functioning of the total force.

So we have to fix the inequities, but it doesn't mean that we have to create a completely separate system to do that.

MR. KEANE: Just following up on that, given the fact you brought it up -- I'm probably all along my fellow commissioner's toes here -- but the -- addressing the separateness issue -- so am I taking from your comments the thought that you would not want to see the National Guard Bureau have a separate budget or have an acquisition system all their own, in a sense creating a -- you know, the embodiment of another service?

GEN. JONES: I think that would be -- my gut feeling is that would be divisive, and I think creating a separate service, if you will, would be counter to the good order and discipline of the armed forces in general. I think what we want is integration, not segregation by virtue of a new system, and I think the Army component should always identify with the United States Army. I think the Air Force components should always identify with the Air Force, similarly with the Navy Reserves and Marine Reserves.

When I was a service chief, I did within my own service try to attack that, the idea that Reservists are different -- in a different category. The chairman was nice enough to mention that in his opening statement. But I really believe that fundamentally it is one service. We have different aspects of it, so it's like we have different MOS and different pay scales for different services rendered, but it can be brought into one cohesive system. And the separate -- the more we separate them and if we move in that direction, I think more problems you're going to have in terms of service cohesion on the battlefield -- not just the battlefield, not just in the war fight, but just in everything that we do, even in those missions where we try to prevent conflict.

MR. KEANE: Mr. Chairman, I'll defer to my colleagues.

MR. DAWSON: Thank you.

Commissioner McKinnon.

DAN MCKINNON: General, you've got a tremendous area of responsibility when you look at it, and I'm just wondering, when you have Reserves over there, how long a period do they serve for? Do they go over as individuals or units or they -- just a few a weeks or do they serve for a year or how does that work?

GEN. JONES: Well, sir, we have a little bit of everything. We have individual commitments and service. We also have units that come over and serve a period of time. Most of the U.S. presence in Kosovo, for example, and earlier in Bosnia, were from the Guard -- were Guard and Reserve units from top to bottom. The newest -- the senior man in American uniform in Sarajevo today is a Reservist.

So the answer is we're dependent on both individual service and unit rotations.

MR. MCKINNON: Do you see any potential for a need for a surge in Reserves to back up any incidents you have over there?

GEN. JONES: I think we're all sensitive of the fact that the point of main effort is Afghanistan and Iraq in the Central Command area. In that sense, the European Command is a force provider for those missions, and we are -- we've tailored our force as best we can to continue to try to do the things that we have to do in our vast AOR, and I think we're doing it quite well. But I think that the priority of effort goes to Iraq and Afghanistan. I'm generally satisfied -- we can always do with more, but I'm generally satisfied that given the possibilities and the state of play with regard to the overall manpower pool -- and I think General Smith will follow me here and comment much more expertly than I can -- I think we're very fortunate to have the numbers that we have, and we're making maximum utilization of those numbers.

MR. MCKINNON: Do you -- from a -- all our effort now is towards Iraq and Iran -- rather Afghanistan. And I'm just wondering, would that kind of training in the European theater would be different should you have any outbreak or any problems there? Is there a different kind of training you have for your area of responsibility as opposed to the Middle East?

GEN. JONES: Anyone that -- any unit that originates from the European Command and goes to Afghanistan and to Iraq goes through -- any Army unit goes through a very intensive training period at our training center at Grafenwoehr, where we try to replicate the conditions that those deploying units will meet in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

But generally speaking, the units that come to us from the United States are generally pretty well ready to go when -- to do the things that we need to do when they get here. So I pay a high compliment to the training -- the predeployment training that these units receive, because when they come in, for example, and when we swap out units in Kosovo, they have got to be ready to go within a couple of days to execute those missions, and generally the predeployment training that they've had from the areas that they've deployed from are very adequate. We complement that, obviously, to bring them up to speed, but there is not too much downtime.

MR. MCKINNON: I just have one last thought. I'm wondering -- as you probably are aware, last weekend, the Congress delegated us as a commission to analyze the National Guard Bureau, and should they have a four star or not and they should they be on the Joint Chiefs, and I'm just wondering what your thoughts are as a former member of the Joint Chiefs.

GEN. JONES: I think I touched on that one in answering General Keane's question, and I would associate my general thinking that I would probably caution against that, simply because of the idea of separateness that it engenders. I'm for more cohesion, more integration in tackling the problems that we currently face rather than create the appearance, either intentional or unintentional, that there is a separate service out there that takes -- that deals with Guard and Reserve units. I don't think that's necessary, and I'm not sure that it would contribute to the total integration of our joint force.

MR. MCKINNON: What about the idea of a fourth star?

GEN. JONES: I think that the Reserve elements of all four services are best used within those services, and I don't see the absolute need of another four star and another member of the Joint Chiefs on that issue. I think that there's enough expertise around to deal with those issues that have to be dealt with as they come up, but within the current construct of the system that we have.

MR. MCKINNON: Okay. Well, we sure appreciate you being with us today. Thank you.

GEN. JONES: Thank you, sir.

MR. DAWSON: Commissioner Stump.

E. GORDON STUMP: Good morning.

I'd like to discuss a little bit more about the State Partnership Program. I was involved with Michigan and the program started in the Baltic states in '93 with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and one of our objectives when we first started the program was to help them become members of NATO, which they have now successfully done. What would you say are the unique characteristics of the National Guard that make them suitable for this State Partnership Program?

GEN. JONES: Sorry.

I think the value of the program is that the Guard has a lot of flexibility in tailoring itself to meet the requirements of the particular state partnership. So it's not a -- it -- and the Guard also brings a lot of expertise from the civilian communities that actually form those units.

I was very impressed just not too long ago in Morocco when they had a major earthquake and there was a lot -- there was need for medical assistance. Before we even organized ourself to think about it and how we were going to do this either in NATO or in the United States European Command, the National Guard unit from -- I think it was -- let's see; it's on the chart here -- from Utah was already landing C-130s full of medical supplies and blankets and foodstuffs and the like, medical supplies, to the area of Morocco -- exactly what they needed, exactly at the right time. The friendships and contacts that members of the Guard and from the state have built with Morocco enabled a very rapid airlift to begin.

And we see this agility and this long-term relationship that builds contacts. It's a two-way street. It's not just from the U.S. to a particular country. It actually goes back the other way as well, with exchanges of views, with -- it goes far beyond the unit's ability. It causes, for example, young people to go back and forth to study at universities. It causes business exchanges, cultural exchanges, political exchanges. And it's a stabilizing influence, particularly in the areas that -- where we most need them.

I think that this program is so important that periodically we ought to make sure that we kind of evaluate the programs to make sure that they're still relevant to the task, but also look at the -- to our south, with the developing continent of Africa, to see how we can do more along those lines.

African -- Africa is a reality that is upon us and will be increasingly upon us. The State Partnership Programs, to the extent that we can extend them down there, is going to force us to really think hard about how we do this. We only have so many states. Is it possible that a state could do more than one program, for example?

So we -- I'm more worried about how we do more of these things and how we judge, say, at some point where a State Partnership program with, say, Ohio and Hungary has served its purpose and how do we get Ohio then perhaps to take on a more challenging program somewhere in Africa, if that's what's needed. So the demand is, I think, going to be increasing. The value added is immense. And it really does show one of the best -- the best of things that come from the United States in the form of these young ambassadors -- and some not so young ambassadors who bring great professional skills to a specific problem set. I can't say enough about the State Partnership Program and what it means.

MR. STUMP: But based upon its success and trying to extend the program to other countries, especially South Africa and Africa, would you then be in favor of possibly dropping some of the -- like, for instance, the Baltic states -- Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia -- and say Michigan, instead of doing those, let's try you with a new country, they're far enough along, or would this be losing those long-term relationships?

GEN. JONES: Well, I think the challenge is how can we do more, recognizing that you're just talking to one combatant commander. There are other geographical combatant commanders. EUCOM is way out in front on this program, and I ought to be a little bit more careful because I don't want the other combatant commanders to encroach on what we have. But these are so powerful that we have to figure out how we can do more along these lines. And at some point part of the process will be to kind of evaluate them and say which ones have reached their kind of the level of maturity and how do we refocus them into another area without necessarily breaking the contact between the state and the country in question.

In other words, I think probably in the life cycle of the SPP, that as the state-country relationships mature, it could be that we could actually extricate the military component and start another one somewhere but still have that relationship between the state and the country in question survive on its own right; exchanges of governors, business leaders, community leaders, cultural leaders and the like. Those things can then have a life of their own. The key that opens those doors is the SPP program. It doesn't mean that it should stay there forever.

MR. STUMP: The expanding to Africa, as in the past we've looked at that, becomes much more expensive to run the program to these new countries. Do we have adequate funding to expand the program beyond where it is now?

GEN. JONES: I think obviously if you're going to expand the program, you're going to need more resources. So that's why I think we have to focus on efficiencies. But we are able -- we've been able to make the case. As you can see, we have these five African partnerships have just matured over the last two or three years. And I think we have some others that are in waiting. (To staff) -- Don't we, Frank?

STAFF: Yes, sir.

GEN. JONES: How many more?

STAFF: Two more right now, sir.

GEN. JONES: And we have two more that are ready to come on line at some point. So I've not had a lot of difficulty in selling this program and finding the resources for it. The question is there's a finite pool of people that can do this. But it is really one of the key success stories in our quiver.

MR. STUMP: I know in Latvia's case, after we started the State Partnership Program, they participated in Bosnia and Kosovo. Have you found some of these other countries that we have had this partnership program with that are now participating with us, say, in Afghanistan, Iraq --

GEN. JONES: Absolutely. The State Partnership Program in some of these newer members of NATO, particularly the former Soviet bloc countries, actually place high value on their contacts with the SPP programs because it aids them in their transformation as they go from the Soviet model to the more Western model. And this daily interaction, regular interaction with the Guard and Reserve, is critical to their transformation. They attach a high value to it.

MR. STUMP: Well, great. Well, I'd like to personally thank you for your support, because having been involved with it, I can tell you it's a two-way street. The Guard learns a lot by working with these --

GEN. JONES: Well, that's true. I mean, these young people learn something about the world. And as I said, it's the key that unlocks a wide panoply of relationships between our cities, our states, and other governments and other countries. And it's really -- it's exciting to watch, and we have to -- I think the future is that we try to -- the challenge is to try to figure out how we can do more things like this in the future because it's high yield and low cost.

MR. STUMP: All right, sir. Well thank you very much.

MR. DAWSON: Thank you, Commissioner Stump.

Commissioner Sherrard.

JAMES SHERRARD: Good morning, sir. And I, again, echo my colleagues' comments about thanking you for your service and the great things you do.

I'd like to just touch on one small aspect of NATO transformation and your ongoing efforts that you have there. How have you seen our allies address transformation with the use of their reserve components? And if in doing so, are there ideas and concepts that we could glean to look at incorporation into our look, through this commission's efforts?

GEN. JONES: I don't have a lot of experience in allied use of reserve forces, so I don't -- I can't shed a lot to that. Let me just see what we have here.

(Pause.)

I think, frankly, in my experience, the model that people key on is the U.S. model. And we generally answer more questions about how we do things than we do the other way around, because we have just some very unique capabilities and unique experiences that other countries just don't have.

So, for example, we just discussed the State Partnership Program. I don't know that another country has this kind of flexibility to reach across the active duty into the Reserves. And the organizations in many of our allied countries don't lend themselves to the same model.

So I think that -- in my experience, I don't have a lot of -- I don't have a lot to offer on that. I'll be happy to study it and get something back to you for the record, if you'd like, if that can be helpful.

MR. SHERRARD: All right. Thank you very much, sir.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MR. DAWSON: Commissioner Stockton.

DONALD L. STOCKTON: Good morning, sir, and thank you so much for being here with us today. We appreciate your expert advice to us, especially with respect to some of the things that you mentioned in your opening statement.

You talked about the Single Integrated Pay and Personnel System, and the reduction in the Reserve duty status categories. I guess one thing that I'm curious about, to dig just a little bit deeper on that, is I think that we've been led to believe that the Marine Corps Total Force system has been a fairly workable model, and that it's been paying benefits for many years now, in part because of your leadership going back to 1999, when you became the commandant of the Marine Corps. We're led to believe that we've been working for a number of years in trying to come up with a defense-wide system called DIMHRS, I believe, that would cover all of the different services.

And I guess we're looking for some specific ideas and recommendations from you on both of these areas. Would it be best to have each service perhaps to have its own system, or would it be better to have a system that covers all the different services under one?

GEN. JONES: I think the trendline for the future ought to be for standardization so that members of our Guard and Reserve understand that regardless of where they serve and what service they're serving in, that it's the same rules, the same standards, same pay scales. And I think anything we can do to remove those perceived inequities and standardize the process and

demystify it and make it easier to work with, will result in suddenly enhanced morale and better -- immediate utilization of our forces in the joint force system.

MR. STOCKTON: Would the other services, then, do well to benchmark off of the system in the Marine Corps?

GEN. JONES: Well, I think everybody's probably got some good ideas. But I think there's a -- from my service when I was commandant, I thought the idea of everyone is first and foremost a Marine, your designation beyond that is secondary. And to try to harmonize the total force into what you need it to, when you need it to do it, recognizing the inherent differences in what everybody brings to the table between the active and the Reserve forces lends itself to creating a cohesive force with that kind of cultural identity.

I'm sure in the other services there are some great ideas that can be seized upon that we could all use. But the goal -- the end state ought to be a common standard, a common pay scale, some common designations that we have in the active duty forces. And the active duty forces are fairly well standardized in how you get paid, how you get ordered around, how you get moved around. And I think we could and should do the same things for the Guard and Reserves.

MR. STOCKTON: Another question that I'd like to explore, it's become increasingly clear that the Marine Corps has quite a different approach on force generation than perhaps the Army does. The Army is developing an Army Force Generation Model, ARFORGEN, which would be a one-in-five or a one-in-six type of deployment schedule for the Reserves.

From your experience as commandant, how do you feel such a model would work for the Marine Corps Reserve? And do you see any ill effects in either recruiting and retention or other things that could limit the sustainability of such a model?

GEN. JONES: I'm not really an expert in the inner workings of other service systems right now owing to my current duties as a combatant commander and as a NATO commander.

My view is that when you deploy forces -- when you're an expeditionary force, as the Marine Corps has been and is, that generally, if the question relates to how do you maintain morale and recruiting and retention in relation to how you use the force, then I think you should strive to have at least a three to one rotational system for your force; in other words, a minimum of three to one. For every one unit that's out, you have one that's back and one that's training to go. Ideally, four to one; and anything that you can do in excess of that is obviously to the good.

How that translates to the Reserves, I'm not quite sure. But I do know -- I'm fairly comfortable in my own service that that was the -- that was kind of the model that we used in order to -- guarantees that families weren't unduly stressed, that units had a chance to recover from deployments, get new people, train them up and come back up on the step and get ready for the next deployment.

Prior to the Iraq, Afghanistan wars and deployments, in the Marine Corps, a Marine could join a unit and see very clearly out two or three years when that unit was going to be scheduled to

deploy and for how long. And we've adopted in the Marine Corps a six-month rotation cycle that seems to work for us. I believe the commandant believes that we're still making our retention goals.

From a combatant commander's perspective, to be perfectly honest, some standardization among the services would be a good thing. It becomes difficult to manage the force when you have such a huge revolving door. Some units are coming in for six months, some units are coming in for a year, some units are coming in for 45 days. There's a lot of different standards out there. I respect the judgments of the service chiefs. We have to manage the force.

But at the user end, it can create some havoc with regard to what you have to do, who you have and what you -- and how you do your job on a daily basis because of the differences in the policies from one service to the other.

MR. STOCKTON: In your judgment, do you think that maybe shorter deployments on a more frequent basis might be better than longer deployments on a less frequent basis?

GEN. JONES: This gets into service cultures a little bit and how services see themselves. In my 40 years in uniform, I remember in Vietnam, in my deployment, my initial deployment was for 13 months as a rifle company -- rifle platoon commander. Everybody else was deploying 12 months. I never really got a good answer, as a second lieutenant, of why I had to stay there an extra 30 days.

You know, when you're -- I think like units ought to have like -- kind of like policies. It seems to me the logic of that is pretty sound. I know that in Iraq, the Marine Corps has, I think, a six-month deployment policy now. The Army has a year. I don't know. I think logic would lead me to recommend that some sort of standardization for like units is not a bad thing.

I never -- I think I will go back and try to find out why I stood -- stayed there 30 days longer than everybody else. (Scattered laughter.) It's hard to explain. But if you -- if you're a service chief, you have other dynamics. And so I really do respect the difficult jobs that they have in coming up with what the right formula is for the service. But it is not lost on the troops when they go off into a particular deployment -- that's a hard one -- and people to the right and left are not there for the same amount of time. It's harder to understand. It can be explained, but it's hard to explain it to the guy in the foxhole.

MR. STOCKTON: It's clear that you do appreciate what the Reserve and Guard members bring to the table and to the warfighting effort. And of course they have a lot of balls that they're juggling in order to do that.

GEN. JONES: So --

MR. STOCKTON: They have their family responsibilities, their employer, and all these things. So certainly having predictability of how they're going to serve and so they know when they sign up what they can expect for the future is a good thing. I see you're nodding. I think --

GEN. JONES: Absolutely.

MR. STOCKTON: Okay.

GEN. JONES: You know, I also think -- you know, I don't want to -- I don't mean that Reserve units have to go for a year, for example, just because an active-duty unit -- I think the active-duty force appreciates having the assistance and the help and the reinforcements of Guard and Reserve units. They know that that's -- they know it's a different category. And so you could have some variation there. They appreciate the fact that they're there and that many of these men and women gave up their jobs to do this, to do whatever it is they're doing.

So I think there's -- my comments that I was talking about had more to do with the active force, but anything that we can do to demystify and standardize how we use our Reserve within the Reserve community and our Guard community, I think would go a long way towards adding to the cohesion of the total force.

MR. STOCKTON: Thank you, sir.

GEN. JONES: Thank you.

MR. DAWSON: Commissioner Lewis.

PATRICIA LEWIS: I want to join in welcoming you this morning, and thank you for your service.

GEN. JONES: Thank you.

MS. LEWIS: It's an honor and a pleasure to have you here. We've talked a little bit about the National Guard Empowerment Act, and we've hit on most of the major components of that legislation that we've been asked to review. There was one piece that I would like to get a final comment from you on, and that's the requirement that the deputy commander of U.S. Northern Command be a member of the National Guard.

Would you like to comment on that recommendation?

GEN. JONES: That's news to me. I -- in my -- again, in my role as -- in Europe and in NATO, I'm not well versed on that particular issue. I'm sorry I can't be of help.

MS. LEWIS: That's okay. I know that you are very sensitive to family issues, and with the increased use of our Reserve component, are there any particular family support issues that we should be more sensitive to or that we could propose recommendations, where we could provide additional support to our Reserve members and their families?

GEN. JONES: My opinion on that is that when the families of Reservists or Guardsmen come out and call on active duty, that they should have the same general benefit and support package that active-duty families have. This is probably a little bit more challenging because of

some of the remote locations, and you can't build a commissary everywhere. But I think we should do everything we can to give them the same support, the same access to benefits that active-duty families have within means and capabilities. So that, to me, is part of the standardization package that adds to the cohesion and morale of the force to know that we recognize people for the same job that they do for the length of time that they do it.

MS. LEWIS: Along those same lines there often are issues of medical and dental readiness when members of the Reserve component are called up. There needs to be some period of time in order to address some of those issues.

Do you have any thoughts or recommendations on how the force could be managed to more appropriately ensure that those folks were ready when it was time for them to be utilized?

GEN. JONES: You mean, the -- for the deployment of the units themselves?

MS. LEWIS: Yes.

GEN. JONES: In my service chief capacity as commandant, I know that our Reserve component was tasked to making sure that when a Marine Corps unit deploys, that it is ready to go in all aspects, to include medical readiness.

I think that the only way you can do this is to do it on a continuing basis. In other words, if you're caught short and you have to scramble to get it done, then you're too late. You're not going to make it. I think units have to understand -- and that's where you get into predictability of how you ramp up to these deployments. If you have vision and you have a metric -- or a matrix that shows exactly what the unit's going to do, then the commanders then have a way in which they can work for that medical readiness to be achieved.

I think those kinds of programs, including family support programs in the Reserve and National Guard, need to make sure that we provide the right funding, also, to keep those things alive so that when somebody pushes the button and a unit needs to get ready to go, that they know how to do that and they have the means and capabilities and the resourcing to do that.

MS. LEWIS: Thank you very much.

GEN. JONES: Thank you.

MR. DAWSON: Commissioner Eckles.

LARRY K. ECKLES: Good morning, General Jones. Thank you for sharing your valuable time with us this morning.

I'd like to talk a little bit about Reserve component equipment. The CBO estimates that once the war in Iraq ends, it will take around \$20 billion to return military equipment to pre-war condition. In congressional testimony this summer, General Peter Pace suggested the process of

resetting the force would last two years or so. He also said that if we go to war somewhere else, we clearly would not have 100 percent of the equipment that we would like to have to fight the war.

As our commission considers likely areas that the Reserve components could be deployed, the ongoing mission in the Balkans and the possibility of additional humanitarian operations in Africa both come to mind. These missions are in your AOR. We've also heard a lot of testimony about equipment shortages due to high optempo in other theaters. How does this situation affect your ability to execute plans for these or other possible contingencies within your AOR?

GEN. JONES: Our situation in EUCOM is that generally when units come to us, they come fairly well equipped, and we have some limited means to augment that equipment from within our own theater. So we do not have -- in the context of the missions that we execute in EUCOM, we do not have a serious shortfall in terms of the equipment for our own missions.

In the overall context of resetting the force, though, after years of combat in Afghanistan, Iraq and just the general use of the equipment, this is going to be a major, major problem not just for the Guard and Reserve. This is going to be a major problem for all of us, in particular the United States Army and the United States Marine Corps, and by association its Reserve forces. We are using up equipment at a much, much faster rate than we would during peacetime, and I know people are thinking about it. I know that I've been in many meetings in the Pentagon in my current capacity where this has been addressed, but it is something that we should not lose sight of because it's a reality that is going to at some point hit us square on.

I think I had a conversation a couple of weeks ago with the chief of staff of the Air Force who said that the average age of the aircraft in the Air Force is the oldest now in the history of the United States Air Force. These are realities. This is -- there is going to be a significant bill associated with that, and it's not going to be limited to just the active-duty force, it's going to be the Reserve also.

MR. ECKLES: Thank you. That's all my questions, Mr. Chairman.

MR. DAWSON: Mr. Rowley.

WADE ROWLEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Jones, thank you very much for being here this morning. We really appreciate the time that you've taken to come before us.

Homeland security is a little out of your lane or EUCOM's lane, but as a combatant commander and a former joint chief, we know you have valuable insight for this commission. The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned Report makes a number of specific recommendations that really affect the Guard and the Reserve.

Two points. One statement in that report, "The Department of Defense should ensure the transformation of the National Guard is focused on increased integration with active duty for homeland security plans and activities, and secondly, in addition to the National Guard, the other Reserve components of the military should modify their organization and training to include a priority mission to prepare and deploy in support of homeland security missions."

The question is, if all the Reserve components make homeland security a priority mission, what effects do you foresee on the availability and readiness of Reserve capabilities that you rely on as a combatant commander?

GEN. JONES: Well, I think there's a careful balance that has to be struck in terms of those mission sets. I do agree with the idea that more can be done in order to make sure that the Guard and Reserve units for homeland security issues are in fact trained -- organized, trained and equipped to provide that kind of support and reaction.

Hopefully, a lot of the restructuring that's being done will also be equally useful in the international missions overseas. In my prepared statement, I think I tried to present the mission set that we rely on. I think it's up to the combatant commanders and the discussions that we have with the service chiefs and the Guard and Reserve forces to make sure that we take the totality of the effort and make sure that it's harmonized in such a way that we can have -- we can do both.

I would imagine that across the potential mission sets, 70 to 80 percent of what we do for our homeland will also be useful in other places. But there's some niche expertise there that I think we should be careful of, that we don't -- that doesn't disappear from the Guard and Reserve, because these are things that we absolutely need overseas when the units come over. So I think we have to just watch it carefully and make sure that we don't -- the pendulum doesn't go too far one way or the other.

MR. ROWLEY: Thank you, General, Mr. Chairman.

MR. DAWSON: Commissioner Brownlee.

LES BROWNLEE: (Off mike) -- me join the chairman and others in thanking you for your extraordinary service to the country and your family as well, your lovely wife, Diane, and your -- especially we'll welcome your two sons here this morning, Kevin and Jim.

And those of us who have had the pleasure of working with you over the years hold in you in very high respect and esteem, and we're very fortunate to have you here this morning.

GEN. JONES: Thank you. Thank you very much.

MR. BROWNLEE: I just -- we kind of find yourself in a position here this morning where -- as someone said, everything that could be said has been said, but everybody hasn't said it yet. So I just wanted to ask you primarily, as we've changed the nature of our Reserve component from a strategic Reserve, as they were during the Cold War, to an operational Reserve, as they are today in the war on terror, what are the major changes you think we ought to consider in our Reserve components as they adjust to these new kinds of missions?

GEN. JONES: If I could shape things the way that I think most combatant commanders would respond to that question, the high-demand, low-density skill sets are really the things that I

would watch very carefully to make sure that we have adequate supply. I think the active component can do pretty well, with a couple of adjustments.

But the real value of the Guard and Reserve for the foreseeable future will be to bring those skill sets that are in short supply and all of a sudden you need a lot of them. Civil affairs, for example, strikes me as something that we've always been trying to generate more of, and those things that, when you go operational in a real-world mission, that you've got to have.

There has got to be some reach-back capability that you can have access to that's organized, trained and equipped and ready to go and integrate seamlessly into the mission. And I touched on some of those in my prepared remarks. But it seems to me that a unique contribution that Guard and Reserve units can do, in addition to the wonderful things they're doing to complement our overall mission, are the specific skill sets that are in short supply, that when you go operational and execute a real-world mission, that you need a lot of it.

And as the missions go on in length, the problem exacerbates itself, and so we need to have enough mass there and enough depth to make sure that the things that we need are available when we need them. And those are known things, generally, Les, I think.

MR. BROWNLEE: We should be able to work together to make sure that that supply doesn't run out.

That's all I have, Mr. Chairman.

MR. DAWSON: We have an opportunity to have a few more minutes, and so I'm going to take the privilege of the chair and ask a couple of questions that I didn't get a chance to earlier, one of which is, in hearing your testimony, one of the things that really comes across pretty clearly is the emphasis you place on integration. And it's not an isolated theme for you; it seems to be a theme that answered General Keane's question, it answered Commissioner Lewis's question about medical care, and it seems to me that one of the more powerful recommendations that you're making for us to be mindful of is to try to treat everybody, as we can, as alike as we can. But given, frankly, the -- I can't say I'm familiar with Title X. I can't say I ever was familiar with Title X, even when I was supposed to be.

But I do recall -- and you may recall as well -- trying to pass the Defense Officers -- something -- Management Act.

GEN. JONES: Personnel Management Act.

MR. DAWSON: And you were around for that, a long, long time ago. And it was a nightmare because we had a great deal of difficulty getting busy members of Congress, in particular in my case, the Senate, to really focus on trying to straighten things out in a way that made things better. I'm not saying DOPMA made things better, I'm just saying the point was it was hard to get people's attention.

So there's a lesson learned there that what you're really -- the implications of what you're suggesting is having to strap on a -- trying to cut back on this complete jungle of disproportionate regulations and things that have kind of grown like topsy. And the more I hear, the more I become convinced that it's a daunting, daunting task. It doesn't mean that if I were a Marine I wouldn't charge straight ahead. But any guidance you may have -- or if I've misread you in some way, let me know.

GEN. JONES: No, you haven't. I think first and foremost, we need to have a philosophy of how we see the end state and what is it that we're trying to achieve, and what are the -- what's the sense of how we do this. And it goes all the way to the resources.

I remember when I was a service chief, a few years ago, trying to understand how the Reserve was budgeted for, and, you know, not necessarily in the Marine Corps because we've always had this integrated total system. But I had the impression that in some of the sister services that the active component was budgeted for and the Reserve -- Guard and Reserve were left to work it out however they could through the Congress. And I think that you have to have simplicity in how you do things. In other words, if the United States Army is going to have its components -- the Guard, Reserve and active duty -- then the budget should reflect honestly what that costs within the budget. And then -- and everything kind of flows from there in terms of pay and allowances, and how you treat people, and the standardization.

If you don't do it that way, if you don't have that kind of simplicity of cohesion and a goal that you're going to try to achieve an -- you're going to try to create in terms of the total force, then de facto you create separateness and the impression from the Guard and Reserve community that, well, they really are on their own, even though we wear the same uniform, but we have to fight for whatever we can get, and we have to do it separately.

So I think -- I'm not sure where we are on that today, frankly, because I've been gone for almost four years. But I know that logically, that seems to be the end state to me that makes sense, that we're all soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines. You should get compensated equally, generally, for the days' work, the days' wages, generally as -- fairly as possible. Families should be treated much the same way. Benefits should be accorded equally, and the system should be -- should not have these built-in contradictions and difficulties in being able to take a Guard and Reserve unit and bring it into the operational structure for however long with conflicting series of regulations and standards that just tie up so much time, both for the parent organization but also for the gaining organization like a combatant commander.

So I -- I don't know if I said that very well, but I deeply -- I believe in the sense of oneness and unity among the services in the service cultures and how we do that.

MR. DAWSON: Well, General Jones, thank you. I am not a bit surprised by the compelling nature of your testimony. It would be keeping in character with your -- my experience with you as a friend and colleague and co-worker for all these years. I'm proud to have been associated with you, as we all are, and we really are deeply appreciative of you taking the time out of your busy schedule to spend these last 90 minutes with us. And if there's nothing else, we will stand in recess for about two minutes while we bring General Smith in.

Thank you.

GEN. JONES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MR. DAWSON: Thank you.

(END)